2,357 Arabian Nights Later, Biden is Turning a New Leaf in Yemen

Jay Ramesh

2,357 days and nights. That’s how long the Yemeni Civil War has been raging on for.

Though the war is still far from being over, the Biden administration has made moves to change US Trump-era outlooks in Yemen. On Friday, Secretary of State Antony Blinken announced that the US will revoke the official designation of terrorist group from the Houthis by February 16. The move will not exempt the Houthis from US economic sanctions, but it will allow the supply of food, medical supplies, and other relief aid to resume flowing into Yemen. 

This announcement signifies a significant shift away from Trump-era policy on Yemen, and subsequently on Iran. Former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo officially designated the Houthis, rebel insurgents fighting against the de jure Yemeni government, as a terrorist organization on January 19. The label prevented people affiliated with the Houthis from accessing any financial support, material, or other purchases affiliated with American institutions.

So food and other supplies can flow into Yemen again, great. But what’s the big picture here?

Well, the Trump administration’s policy towards the Middle East was marked by a general strategy of aggressive containment towards Iran. This manifested itself in sanctions on Iran, withdrawal of the US from the 2015 Iran Nuclear Deal, and attempts to squeeze Iran out of supporting its allies in several proxy conflicts throughout the Middle East. By taking an aggressive stance towards Iran, the administration also tightened its relationship with Saudi Arabia, Iran’s number 1 adversary in the region.

And of course by “tightened its relationship”, I mean that the administration basically wrote the Saudi government blank checks to conduct a proxy war in Yemen.

The Biden administration has been working to change that narrative, and this shift in policy could signal a completely new approach to US foreign relations in the Middle East. Biden has already announced that the US will end its support for Saudi Arabia’s offensive operations in Yemen. Taking a step back from Trump’s hardline approach to Iran, and subsequently its close alignment with the Saudis, opens the door for a more, dare I say it, humanitarian approach to relations and conflicts in the Middle East.
Easing pressure on Iran and withdrawing support for the Saudi’s offensives in Yemen does not mean that the US is moving towards diplomatic isolationism, or that it’s showing weakness. Rather, Biden’s tougher and more principled approach to the Saudis has helped ease tensions in the region, furthering US interests in the region. The Saudis had effectively blockaded Qatar for 3 years, but Biden’s pressure has led to an end of the blockade, as well as the release of several Saudi political prisoners, including human rights activists.

This easing of tensions will reopen diplomatic possibilities in the region, including using newly-opened Qatari airspace and US military bases, which can all be used as leverage when negotiating with Iran. Taking a more balanced approach to the Middle East serves to reduce the possibility of alienating typically US-aligned nations like Qatar, while also allowing US foreign policy to be at least influenced by humanitarianism. Yemen may be a graveyard of Saudi tanks, soldiers, and dreams of an Iranian puppet state, but perhaps some good can eventually rise from the ashes.

The Northeast of India

Rohan Rajesh

When people think of India in their mental maps, most will probably see a peninsula jutting out from the underside of Asia into the Indian Ocean. They may see the land bounded by the Himalayas to the north and the Indus to the west. Frequently missing in this cartography is a landlocked section of India, consisting of seven states, separated from the rest of India by a thin strip of land between Bangladesh, Nepal, and Bhutan and surrounded by those countries as well as Tibet and Myanmar. Colloquially and in policy circles, this region is known as the Northeast. The region is at once a part of India and distinctly separate from it. Although these seven states are grouped together, the people living there are frequently more different from each other than from the rest of India. Many parts of Northeast India have seen devastating separatist conflict with the Indian government, which wants to maintain control over the region but frequently neglects it because of its minimal electoral influence. India’s relationship with these states touches on many issues, including what it means to be an Indian.

If India is diverse, the Northeast is a microcosm of that diversity. Although the region is grouped collectively, the people of the eight states – Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, Sikkim, and Tripura – do not have a sense of nationhood. There will likely never be a country that consists of these states. For one thing, linguistically, they are incredibly diverse. Although Assamese (an Indo-Aryan language related to Bengali and Hindi-Urdu) has the most speakers in the region, innumerable Sino-Tibetan and Austroasiatic languages are also spoken in these states, while Hindi and Bengali are also influential. 

These states are religiously diverse as well. In the states of Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, and Nagaland, Christianity has been either the majority, plurality, or significant minority religion since British Christian missionaries began converting locals in the 19th and 20th centuries. For that reason, these states also have a fairly high level of English proficiency, which makes migrants from these states valuable in India’s burgeoning service sector. In Assam, although Hindus form a majority, Muslims form a third of the population. In Arunachal Pradesh and Sikkim, Tibetan Buddhists form a significant minority and a majority, respectively.

The existence of these states also creates a racial issue in India. Many of the people living here do not look “Indian.” They tend to look like people in East and Southeast Asia. This has created serious issues in major cities where these migrants go. Shopkeepers in Delhi beat a young man from Arunachal Pradesh to death in 2014, leading to a reckoning for India on the issue of race. A lot of these issues (as usual) stem from British rule, during which the British government divided Indians along racial lines. But racial issues with the Northeast are another headache that India has to deal with to maintain unity.

Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh are the most peaceful regions in the Northeast. Sikkim is an interesting state since it was once an independent country, albeit a protectorate of India. Its monarchy and sovereignty were eliminated when the state was merged with India in 1975 via a (somewhat controversial) referendum, which followed an Indian intervention due to political turmoil in the erstwhile kingdom. Arunachal Pradesh does not have any significant separatist issues but is the subject of a major territorial dispute between India and China, which claims most of the state as “South Tibet.” 

The other states have seen varying degrees of separatism. These states are covered under the controversial Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA), which essentially gives immunity from prosecution to Indian forces battling insurgents. In battling human-rights-violating insurgents, the Indian government has also committed egregious crimes there. In Assam, the government allegedly backed “death squads” to kill the families of insurgents to dissuade locals from joining separatist groups. In 1966, the Indian government (under the ostensibly inclusive rule of the Indian National Congress) launched airstrikes in Mizoram, the only time the Indian government has ever done so against its own citizens. To combat the same insurgency, the Indian government forced villagers into so-called Protective and Progressive Villages (PPV), a program reminiscent of the US military’s controversial Strategic Hamlet Program during the Vietnam War. Ironically, most of these strategies were taken from the colonial playbook, which the Indian Independence movement fought against.

Recently, however, the Northeast has seen a decline in deaths and conflict. Much of this has to do with the BJP’s recent push in the region. In every one of these states, the BJP and/or its allies are in control of the state government. In the 2019 national elections, the BJP decimated the opposition Indian National Congress. Why is a region with significant Muslim and Christian populations electing the BJP? A major reason is that the BJP-led government has invested significantly in this long-neglected region. 

As part of the government’s Act-East policy, the Modi administration has invested significantly in infrastructure in the region to connect India to Southeast Asia. Electorally, the BJP has strategically allied with local parties while also tackling issues important in the Northeast. One of these is immigration, specifically from Bangladesh. Many in the Northeast resent the Bengali migration, be they Hindu refugees or Muslims seeking economic opportunities. In the state of Tripura, Bengalis form the majority of the population while ethnic Tripuris are the minority. This apprehension about Bengali immigration is why the controversial National Register of Citizens in Assam was so popular – it disenfranchised many people, most of whom were Bengali. 

However, the BJP is experiencing difficulties too. While the NRC is popular, the same anti-Bengali politics also explain why the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) was so unpopular – it would give Hindu refugees from Bangladesh a chance to stay. At the same time, the BJP’s obsession with banning the sale of beef has irked many in the Northeast, where beef is commonly consumed. 

It remains to be seen how the BJP will maintain its delicate balancing act. The policies that make it popular in North India are unpopular in the Northeast, and at the end of the day, North India provides more electoral power than any other region in India. The BJP’s anti-Bengali policies in the Northeast are understandably controversial in the populous state of West Bengal, where the BJP is eagerly looking to make inroads in the upcoming legislative assembly elections. It may be that the BJP’s focus on the Northeast will be enough to prevent opposition parties from returning. But critical issues remain in the region, particularly with regards to the AFSPA. While the world’s attention is currently diverted to the farmer protests in Punjab (where AFSPA used to be under effect) and is usually focused on Kashmir (where AFSPA is under effect), rarely has any significant attention been brought to the Northeast.

Currently, the main insurgent group in the state of Nagaland is in peace talks with the government. However, the relationship is rocky, and a successful peace deal does not mean the insurgency will go away. If the two sides can pull of the deal, it could signal peace in the region and potentially more investment. 

But the issue of who is an Indian will always remain. One way to solve the issue is by getting students to study the cultures and histories of all Indians. National history curricula in India tend to focus on the history of Delhi and the surrounding areas, and the Northeast will rarely find mention. Expanding the curricula will help all Indians feel Indian while mitigating racial antagonism. Inclusivity is important, particularly for countries as diverse as India. That’s a lesson India needs to learn, not just for the Northeast but for every separatist headache that the Indian government can never seem to solve.

Scotland the Brave, Scotland the Independent?

Jennings Dixon

Everyone wants to go to Scotland these days but are the Scots happy to have them? Scottish First Minister, Nicola Sturgeon, is taking a vocal stand against other world leaders from entering. In early January, former U.S. president Trump contemplated jetting off to Scotland to play a few rounds of golf instead of going to the inauguration; Sturgeon dismissed any of those ideas. Just this week, UK prime minister Boris Johnson decided to take a trip up north from Downing Street, and Sturgeon was less than thrilled. Sturgeon called his visit non-essential, but Johnson and the rest of his Conservative Party think otherwise.

An independent Scotland has sounded more mythical than the unicorn, but recent years have given slight hope to the possibility. For years a distrust and distaste against Westminster has grown in Scotland. Scots were concerned that the government in London was not properly representing Scotland. This irritation reached its zenith in 2014 when Scotland held an independence referendum. Ultimately Scots voted 55-45% against the independence referendum. Major issues such as economic and trade policy as well as maintaining European Union (EU) membership played integral roles in the decision. 

Scotland’s driving force of staying in the UK was to cling to the myriad benefits of the EU. However that all changed in 2016 when former Prime Minister Theresa May announced that the UK planned to withdraw from the EU (#brexit). Scotland overwhelmingly voted against Brexit. The formal withdrawal was finalized only last year with Johnson at the helm. The Scottish government continues to worry that lacking EU membership will leave the country worse off.

Then 2020 hit. We all know what that means. Since March, Johnson has been notorious for being reactive rather than proactive in his COVID-19 response. The UK currently ranks fifth and fourth in the world by cases and deaths, respectively. Sturgeon has been a staunch critic of Johnson’s policies and has called for more action and support. Earlier this month she announced a new lockdown for Scotland, as a new strain of the virus is accounting for almost half of recent cases. Current polls show a majority of Scots disapprove of Johnson’s handling of the pandemic while also supporting the choice to leave the UK. This is a sizable shift from 2014.

In an attempt to save face, Johnson jetted up to Scotland this week, visiting a hospital in Glasgow to promote vaccine distribution. Sturgeon staunchly opposes his trip; it violates new lockdown orders and appears to be an attempt to reconcile with Scotland. He is worried about Scotland’s growing disdain for how he has handled the pandemic and old feelings of independence. Johnson dismissed rumors about a new referendum, promising that he is only concerned about getting the virus under control. That is just not the case.

In May, Scotland holds local elections for seats in the Scottish Parliament at Holyrood. Sturgeon’s party, Scottish National Party (SNP) is the leading proponent of an independent Scotland. According to recent polls, SNP is slated for a big win in May. If that prediction comes to fruition, then SNP may have a shot at winning a majority in Holyrood, which would mean prioritizing the passing of a new referendum. Sturgeon has said already that she is devising a roadmap for a new legal independence referendum regardless of Johnson and Westminster's consent.

For the past several years Scotland has been inching closer and closer to independence. With a mix of Brexit and the current COVID-19 crisis, Scots have been feeling less inclined to trust the UK government for making its own decisions. Sturgeon is a strong leader with a clear focus. She understands her people and what they want, and she has the capacity to make change. It’s possible that within the next year the world has a new country to add to its list, and we’ll all have to update our globes. But whatever happens, I think it’s safe to say that the United Kingdom isn’t as united as it once was.

“The Underwear Poisoner”: What’s going on in Russia?

Jay Ramesh

Imagine that you’re in second grade. Everyday, your teacher walks your class to the library after lunch, and she picks a new line-leader every week based on whoever answers the most questions in class. It’s the second week of class, and you’re selected as the line-leader. You have fun walking your class to the library, and all your best friends walk right behind you. Now imagine that it’s the third week of class, and you see that a kid you don’t like is answering a lot of questions in class, threatening your position as line leader. So, taking the most logical approach possible, you put raisins in his cookie at lunch so that he throws up and has to go home, cementing your position as line-leader. According to Russian politician and activist Alexei Navalny, that’s what it feels like to be Vladimir Putin, President of Russia.

Putin has been the undisputed leader of Russian politics for 21 years, even amending the constitution to allow him to theoretically remain president for another 15 years. Though he has historically enjoyed mass popular support, he has faced heavy criticism from political opposition leaders, most notably 44-year old Alexei Navalny, a political leader and anti-corruption activist. Navalny had run for Mayor of Moscow back in 2013, but ultimately lost to a Putin-appointed incumbent mayor. 

The next year, the Russian government accused Navalny of embezzlement, which was widely seen as a purely political move to prevent him from running in subsequent elections. Navalny tried to run for president in 2018 but was barred due to his previous embezzlement charges.

Navalny has released many documents and a documentary exposing corruption in Putin’s Russia, marking himself as an enemy of the current regime. On August 20, 2020, he fell into a coma while on a flight to Moscow and rushed to a Berlin hospital. Subsequent international tests revealed that he had been exposed to a deadly soviet-era nerve agent. 

Navalny spent several months recovering from the coma and called Putin “The Underwear Poisoner”, accusing Putin of attempting to poison and assassinate him. He later released evidence that Russian agents had placed the nerve agent in the lining of his underwear.

When he returned to Moscow on January 17, Navalny was immediately detained and will be held in custody until February 15. His return to Russia has sparked waves of protests across the nation, most of which have been brutally suppressed by police in full riot gear. At least 5,000 people across the nation have been arrested after police used batons, tasers, and tear gas to subdue peaceful crowds of protestors. 

Navalny released a Youtube documentary after his arrest where he attempts to expose Putin’s wealth and corruption within Russia. As of the time of this writing, the video has over 100,000,000 views. For the past 21 years, the future of Russia has always been tied to the future of Putin, but the mass demonstrations across the country may signal that the Underwear Poisoner’s grip over Russia is nearing its end.

From Portugal to Panaji: The History of the Portuguese Raj

Rohan Rajesh

Much of the contemporary discourse on European imperialism in India focuses on the British. Indeed, the British did form the largest empire in India compared to the other European powers. But the British were not the first to enter India and were not the last to leave. Both those distinctions go to the Portuguese. While the British Raj started in 1757 and ended in 1947 (190 years), the Portuguese Raj lasted from 1505 to 1961, a whopping 456 years. Although the Portuguese ruled over a much smaller territory than the British, the history of Portuguese India is no less fraught with the crimes of imperialism.

Portuguese India was founded six years after Vasco da Gama’s discovery of a sea route to India around Africa in 1505. The first major Portuguese (and European) settlement in India was the port city of Cochin (today Kochi) on the southwest Indian coast. Portuguese India largely consisted of ports scattered along India’s western and eastern coasts, which were mainly used for trade. At one point, these ports included Bombay (today Mumbai) until it was given to the British as a royal marriage dowry in 1661. 

The Portuguese’s first and largest territory in Asia was the province of Goa on India’s west coast. Today, Goa is famed for its beaches, siesta culture, baroque churches, and nightlife. But in the heyday of European imperialism, Goa was the nexus for Portugal’s activities in India and indeed the Indian Ocean. Initially, for administrative purposes, all of Portugal’s African and Indo-Pacific territories were administered by the Portuguese Indian government, including Mozambique, Macao, and Timor-Leste, until the 19th century.

Despite the beauty of the various regions of Portuguese India, not all was well. The Portuguese fought with neighboring Indian kingdoms (most notably the Marathas) and pirates. Epidemics and competition from Europeans – especially the Dutch, the French, and the English – led to the decline in Portugal’s dominance in the region. Perhaps the most violent and controversial period in Portuguese India was the Goa Inquisition. 

This inquisition was essentially a transplant of the ones occurring in the Iberian Peninsula around this time in terms of the barbarity of the exercise. While on the Iberian Peninsula, the inquisitions targeted Jews and Muslims, in India, they targeted anyone who was not Portuguese Catholic, including Hindus, Buddhists, Jews, and Muslims. It is alleged that the Portuguese destroyed a tooth relic of the Buddha. 

The inquisition also targeted local Christian communities. The presence of Syro-Malabar Christians in India is almost as old as Christianity itself, but they were not Catholic and were persecuted by the inquisitors. The same treatment was meted out to newly converted Catholics who continued to follow local customs like speaking their native Konkani language, playing local instead of Western instruments, or growing Tulsi plants outside their houses. They were accused of being “crypto-Hindus,” “crypto-Muslims,” or “crypto-Jews.” Even if locals converted fully to Catholicism and Portuguese customs, that was not enough to escape good old-fashioned racism. Natives were frequently referred to as “negros” and “cachorros” (“dogs”). Portuguese priests would refer to Indian priests as “black priests” and deny them promotion.

Perhaps none other than Voltaire summarized the barbarity and hypocrisy best: “Goa is sadly famous for its inquisition, equally contrary to humanity and commerce. The Portuguese monks made us believe that the people worshiped the devil, and it is they who have served him.” 

By 1947, when India gained independence from Britain, only the French and Portuguese had possessions in India. France quickly gave up its possessions to India. Portugal, however, refused, much to the chagrin of the Indian government and Indian nationalists in Portuguese India. The first blow to the Portuguese came in 1954, when Indian nationalists overthrew the local Portuguese administration and replaced it with a pro-India administration that would be officially incorporated into India in 1961. Portugal brought the issue to the International Court of Justice at The Hague, which ruled that the Portuguese had the right to the colonies, but that India had the right to block inter-colony access. 

Portugal continued to refuse to give up the rest of its possessions, which included Goa and Daman & Diu. Western powers (allied with the Portuguese) urged restraint from India, but, by then, India’s patience had worn thin. India invaded Portuguese India and easily repelled the Portuguese counterattack. India had ended Portugal’s more than 450-year presence in India in two days. Portugal appealed to the UN Security Council, but India was protected by a Soviet veto.

Although most Western powers recognized that Portugal should have given up its colonies, they were disappointed by the fact that India had used military force after advocating non-violence for so long. Indeed, President Kennedy told the Indian ambassador to the US, “People are saying, the preacher has been caught coming out of the brothel.” 

Many leaders in the Third World countered that India had been “extraordinarily patient” and had used violence only as a last resort. To be fair, India had already fought a war with Pakistan in 1947 and would fight one with China a year later in 1962. Besides, the issue of the annexation of Portuguese India quickly became a dead letter even in Portugal. In 1974, Portugal’s right-wing authoritarian government fell in the Carnation Revolution, and diplomatic relations between Portugal and India were restored under Portugal’s new democratic government, which signed a treaty with India, recognizing Indian sovereignty over former Portuguese territories.

Despite its long presence in India, only Goa has retained significant Portuguese influence. English remains the most influential European language in India, although quite a few words have been borrowed from Portuguese in many Indian languages. For example, the word for “keys” throughout India is cāvī or cābī, from the Portuguese chave. Likewise, the word for “cupboard” is variations of almārī from the Portuguese armário. The ubiquity of these words across often unrelated Indian languages is evidence of the once-pervasive influence of Portugal along India’s coastlines even at the height of Indian empires like the Vijayanagara, the Mughals, and the Marathas. While Portugal’s influence in India is not embedded in its national conscience like the British Raj, the Portuguese Raj is interesting as it was the origin of European imperialism in India and the last vestige of it to fall.

Why we all need to know about Iraq

Zoe Hatsios

If I asked you which political party Saddam Hussein rose to power through, I bet you could not tell me. So why were 72% of Americans supportive of the invasion in 2003?

Political elites have an incredible amount of issue framing influence, and this was exhibited most evidently by President George W. Bush’s coverage of the political tumult in Iraq; not only was he able to persuade the public, but he pressured intelligence into an inaccurate report that Saddam was fostering nuclear arms - enough speculation to provide reason to invade immediately.

So when it became clear that Saddam actually did not have a nuclear arsenal, why didn’t we back out?

These are the questions foreign policy theorists should continue to ask. This action violated international law yet was still supported by a majority of the American public 5 years later. When I began to study this issue, I realized that this partially boils down to simple grand strategy alignment. Offshore balancers may criticize the War on Terror from the get-go, but others suggest that it is the duty of the United States to be a global policeman and spread democracy worldwide.

I am skeptical of the latter theory for multiple reasons, but what became most clear to me is that general US leadership and average Americans know virtually nothing about different cultures, specifically those that fall under non-democratic regime types. When Saddam Hussein first took hold of the Iraqi Ba’ath government in mid-1979, the party had been flourishing for a decade and state-sponsored employment was at a high. Prior to the Ba’athist occupation, no government had been in stable power in the region since the fall of the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, by 2003, despite Saddam’s intense repression and human rights abuses, some citizens felt as though American invasion was an infringement on a safe haven that Iraq had not experienced for almost a century.

Saddam Hussein was not fostering a nuclear arsenal. His regime was (initially) relatively successful and the party is still in power, although weakened, in Syria. Unlike the complete lack of nationhood that was resembled by Afghanistan, the most significant issues in Iraq arose from the treatment of rebels, aside from US distaste for authoritarianism. Tangentially, war is not an effective tactic for long-term state-building. All to say, the Bush Administration made a huge mistake, which the US government is literally still paying for. American intervention actually encouraged the rise of major terrorist groups, such as Al-Qaeda and ISIS.

Yet, we still look at the Middle East and say, “let’s help - let’s democratize.” Public support for troops in the Middle East is actually growing. Despite the immense amount of defense dollars spent and the background rise of new hegemons (namely, China), US foreign policy remains focused on the oil-rich, terror-stricken region.

And maybe this could be beneficial - if a non-violent approach was taken.

Even I could learn so much more valuable information about the Middle East: this is by no means comprehensive. It is just a starting point for holding skepticism in our country’s foreign policy decisions.

International Trauma and a Brave New World

Joshua O’Brien

For eleven months now, the world has been living through what might very well be the most traumatic event since the Second World War. At the time of writing, 105.8 million people are known to have contracted the disease, and 2.3 million have died as a result. These numbers are understated and are going to increase until this all ends.

The pandemic has brought personal pain to many. Some have gotten it; some have lost loved ones to it. All of us have made sacrifices because of it. Having been living an altered life for so long, I and many others are feeling burned out and isolated. The trauma of this pandemic is one wrought on all of humanity.

So, I have to wonder, what comes next? How will we move on from this? First, we will need to distribute effective vaccines and create a world where SARS-CoV-2 is no longer responsible for an excess of severe illness and death. Eventually, social distancing and health guidelines will relax. But then what? How will the economy recover? Will it continue to leave the most vulnerable amongst the global population behind? How will politics change? As a historian, I naturally wonder about the lasting impacts of such catastrophic events. The Second World War changed the face of Europe, and its broken alliance defined world politics for fifty years. The end of the Cold War strangled the momentum and allure of global Marxism. The Great Recession fermented a rise in nationalist politics. What will the Pandemic do?

Naturally, I hope that the trauma will lend itself to collective healing. Perhaps we can, as the President of the United States hopes, “build back better.” Perhaps we can foster international cooperation on trade and health. Or, perhaps, blame and heartache will foster animosity and frustration between nations. As optimistic as I want to be, I am concerned that the latter option is more likely.

Regardless, the post-pandemic world will not be the pre-pandemic world. We won’t be able to return to the norms of those halcyon days. Like the trauma of the World Wars and economic crises of the past brought new politics, players, and cultures, the trauma of the Pandemic will surely do the same. I look with excitement and fear towards this Brave New World.

What Happened to Sikhs in 1984

Rioting, Ethnic Cleansing, or Genocide?

Rohan Rajesh

As the farmers’ protests persist in the Indian states of Punjab and Haryana, references have been made to the Punjab Insurgency, a period of severe violence in Punjab from 1981 to 1995. One of the most controversial events of the insurgency was the 1984 anti-Sikh riots. The latter term is the Indian government’s official term, but some activists and community leaders claim the event was a genocide. While the event was horrific and irreprehensible, regardless of which term is used, words matter. After nearly 40 years, the events still serve as an unsewn tear in India’s communal fabric.

Since the Partition of India, some Sikhs began advocating an independent state for their people known as Khalistan. A few became radicalized by the proposition, leading to an insurgency (with backing from Pakistan) on New Delhi’s doorstep. At the same time, local Sikh parties began demanding autonomy for Punjab from New Delhi as well as the recognition of Sikhism as a separate religion from Hinduism (the Indian Constitution includes Sikhism, Jainism, and Buddhism under Hinduism for legal purposes). Additionally, India had invested more in agriculture during the Green Revolution, and Punjabi agriculture benefitted handsomely. But New Delhi also wanted to reallocate river water between Punjab and its neighboring states, heightening anxieties in the rural areas. Economic inequality between urban and rural areas increased, leading to significant rural youth unemployment. All of these factors led to a violent movement for Khalistan gaining some traction, resulting in hundreds of deaths in the early 1980s. The situation worsened in 1984. 

That was the year Operation Blue Star was launched by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi (no relation to Mahatma Gandhi) of the Indian National Congress (INC) party. An important insurgent, Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale, took up residence in the Golden Temple (the Sikh equivalent of Mecca) to evade the authorities. Bhindranwale had gained significant popularity among rural youth and was linked to several murders and assassinations. The government went guns blazing and stormed the temple to capture Bhindranwale (who was killed in the fighting) and other militants. Many Sikhs were outraged by what they perceived as an assault on their faith. In retaliation, Indira Gandhi was assassinated by her Sikh bodyguards. 

Angry Hindus began killing Sikhs and looting Sikh-owned businesses across North India, particularly in Delhi. They were also instigated and aided by members of the INC. Around 11,000 Sikhs were killed across North India, including 3,000 in Delhi alone. A sting operation by Cobrapost, an Indian investigative news source, claims that the Indian government and local police either did not prevent or outright colluded with the rioters. After the killings, Indira Gandhi’s son and successor Rajiv Gandhi callously responded, “When a great tree falls, the earth shakes,” as if the killings of thousands of innocent Sikhs were justified over the actions of two.

Now, let us look at the 1948 Genocide Convention definition of genocide. First, there must be intent to partially or completely destroy a national, ethnic, racial, or religious minority by any of the following means:

1. Killing members of the group;

2. Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;

3. Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;

4. Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;

5. Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

In determining if killings are genocide, the intent is the most important part. Few genocidaires leave detailed plans for the destruction of groups like the Nazis or the Khmer Rouge. That’s why genocide is so difficult to prosecute and why many governments, including the US government, are reluctant to wield the term for the Rohingya massacres in Myanmar. Instead, the Trump administration used the term “ethnic cleansing,” which does not have legal significance. During the Rwandan Genocide, the Clinton administration only publicly stated that “acts of genocide may have occurred” because calling the event a genocide would have necessitated a more robust response than the administration was willing to deliver.

With the events of 1984, there is no explicit documented intent on the part of the perpetrators to wipe out Sikhs in Hindu-majority areas. Legally, the massacres were brutal, senselessly violent revenge (At the same time, it is worth mentioning that Khalistani militants deliberately targeted and killed hundreds of Hindus in Punjab through the course of the insurgency). Of course, we are only talking about the legal definition of genocide, and naturally, many people would have broader views on the definition of genocide. 

While the term “genocide” may be legally tricky, the Indian government should certainly stop referring to the massacres as “riots.” Whatever the events of 1984 were, they were not disorganized or sporadic, but they were one-sided. The term “riots” obscures the true horror of the event and has led to frustration for many survivors.

Multiple government investigations have yielded few results. While low-level INC members have been convicted, many of the key players, witnesses, and victims are dead, and no police officers have been convicted. At the same time, investigations in India are heavily influenced by politicians, leading to few convictions for members of the INC. Whether or not subsequent investigations lead to convictions, at the very least, more education needs to be implemented in school curricula, and something similar to the Holocaust Museum should be created not only for the 1984 massacres but also for the other communal killings that have occurred in India’s post-Partition history, regardless of the party responsible. Only by acknowledging the sins of the past can we be ready to progress together.

First 100 Days

Reflections on the Biden Administration and International Relations

Joshua O’Brien

I am aware that it is a faux pas to write about America for an IR blog associated with The Internationalist, but I am going to offer three excuses. First is the fact that I carry an American passport and civics education, so the topic is of personal expertise. Second is the fact of America’s standing in the world—perhaps the United States cannot claim the superpower status it had in the 1990s, but it is still one of the world’s Great Powers. Its foreign policy has an effect on its many allies and adversaries. And lastly, this is a thought exercise we only get to observe every four or eight years. I want to take advantage of it.

My first reaction to the new Administration’s foreign policy is to cite Warren G. Harding in praising a return to normalcy. The foreign policy team Joe Biden has assembled is filled with stars. The President’s own resume includes both Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations committee and the Vice Presidency. Secretary of State Blinken is a career foreign policy official with institutional knowledge, and UN Ambassador-designate Linda Thomas-Greenfield is an experienced diplomat. Foreign policy stars from the Obama Administration are also returning. Samantha Power will head USAID, and Jake Sullivan is Biden’s National Security Advisor. Susan Rice is also returning, but with a limited domestic focus. The Biden team on foreign policy seems poised to work congenitally and with expertise that was lacking for the previous four years.

But I think it is flawed to merely term the new White House as a “return to normalcy” because it is refocusing itself with experts. Early policies have been more substantive than routine. Earlier this week, the President halted arms sales to long-time ally Saudi Arabia, and his climate executive orders have required climate change to be considered by the National Security Council as a key concern in its decision-making. Thomas-Greenfield took a stern stance on China in her Senate hearings, and press reports have indicated an already icy relationship between Presidents Biden and Putin. The Administration will clearly take a tougher approach to China than the Obama White House, and it will be even more active on the threat of climate change. The early significance of these decisions in outlining a broader agenda should not be missed as mere normalcy, but as significant and meaningful changes to American foreign policy from the previous administrations of this century.

In short: Average Joe might be a little more than average, and although the new Administration might seem like routine establishment, its figures also seem eager to make meaningful, even idealistic change.

Canada’s Frosty Relations with India

Rohan Rajesh

As tensions between China and the West continue to rise, India has been viewed as a democratic Asian alternative to help contain Chinese expansionism. While India has had comfortable relations with most western powers, one exception remains – Canada. Relations between Canada and India have faced many frictions for the past forty years or so over one issue. Most recently, Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau made comments expressing concern over the farmers’ protests in India. The protests, the most significant challenge to Modi since the anti-CAA protests last year, have been concentrated in the Punjab state, the majority of whose population is Sikh. India was furious, and one word hung like a cloud in the minds of Indian policymakers, which has poisoned relations between India and Canada for decades: Khalistan.

Khalistan is a separatist ideology that calls for an independent state for the Sikhs of the Punjab region of northwest India. During the Partition of India, the Punjab region was divided between India and Pakistan, with Muslims fleeing west and Hindus and Sikhs fleeing east. For much of India’s post-independence history, the idea of Khalistan had always been a fringe ideology. Sikhs formed a substantial part of the Indian independence movement, military, and government, and the Punjab region has been India’s breadbasket since the Green Revolution. At the same time, in the overall Punjab region (which includes the states of Punjab, Haryana, and Himachal Pradesh), Hindus form the majority. In the Punjab state, in particular, Sikhs comprise the majority but with a substantial Hindu minority. So, the feasibility of a landlocked Sikh state with a significant Hindu minority has always been a question mark.

Still, the Khalistan movement gained significant momentum in the 1980s, mainly over concerns about the diversion of river water. Violence against Hindus, moderates, and government officials increased. In 1984, Sikh extremists fleeing Indian security forces hid in the Golden Temple. The Golden Temple is to Sikhism what Mecca is to Islam. So, when the Indian government stormed and fired bullets and artillery at the temple to flush out the extremists, there was a predictably negative reaction from the Sikh community. Although most Sikhs did not support the terrorists, many were furious with the government for using excessive force and damaging their holy site. Then-Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was assassinated by her two Sikh bodyguards over the issue. That led to a horrific anti-Sikh pogrom in North India (particularly in Delhi), mostly stoked by Gandhi’s Indian National Congress party, and the actors responsible were not prosecuted. 

From there, the insurgency in Punjab gained significant momentum, and the killings continued. It was widely suspected that Pakistan’s intelligence agency, the ISI, was supporting the insurgents, leading New Delhi to crack down harshly. The strategic importance for New Delhi of containing the insurgency is hard to understate. The region borders Pakistan and is close to the national capital, Sikhs form a significant part of the military, and the region is critical to India’s food security.

The situation continued to worsen through the eighties and the nineties. Eventually, the Indian government managed to force the movement underground, many Sikhs became disillusioned with the Khalistan movement, and since 1995 the insurgency in Punjab has mostly been a non-issue. That said, India still looks apprehensively at any perceived threats to its territorial integrity, which brings us to its tense relations with Canada.

The Sikh diaspora in Canada is extremely influential. Even though they only form 1% of Canada’s population, their effective organization, and a particular quirk in Canada’s electoral system magnify their importance. Unlike in the US, Canadian candidates for Parliament for each party are selected based on the number of signatures they get from party members and voters rather than by a general primary vote. This “pay-to-play” system rewards organized interests who can get more signatures. This explains why, despite their small numbers, there are more Sikhs in Canada’s House of Commons and cabinet than in the equivalents in India. It also explains why even a minority within a minority (like Canadian Sikh supporters of Khalistan) can gain so much influence.

In the 1980s, members of the Sikh diaspora in Canada and other western countries provided significant support to the Khalistan movement. In 1985, the deadliest act of aviation terrorism before 9/11 and the worst terrorist attack in Canadian history occurred when Canadian Sikh extremists placed a bomb on an Air India flight traveling from Montreal to Delhi. All 329 people on board, including 268 Canadian citizens, 27 British citizens, and 24 Indian citizens, were killed. Although the Khalistan movement may have died down in India, in the West, a minority within the Sikh minority has played a visible role in supporting Khalistan.

This dynamic has led to awkward situations in India-Canada relations. In 2018, Trudeau made an official trip to India. Unfortunately, Trudeau’s office sent an invitation to a Sikh extremist convicted of attempted murder. The extremist in question, Jaspreet Atwal, was found guilty of trying to murder an Indian minister in 1986 and was blamed for an assault on British Columbia’s then-premier Ujjal Dosanjh, a moderate Sikh who vociferously opposes Khalistan and violent extremism. The invitation was rescinded, but not before Atwal had taken pictures with Mr. Trudeau’s wife. The Indian government was understandably miffed, and that incident set the tone for the rest of the disastrous trip.

Many commentators have pointed to the incident as one of many where Khalistanis have been able to penetrate Canadian politics and Trudeau’s Liberal Party, in particular. In 2017, Trudeau attended a parade for Khalsa Day (the Sikh New Year). That parade included floats glorifying Khalistani militants. There are several other incidents you can find quite easily on the internet. The bottom line is that these issues are undermining Canada’s relationship with India at a time when Canada wants to diversify its portfolio on issues ranging from trade to defense. 

Obviously, the Canadian government cannot and should not try to stop peaceful demonstrations just to placate India. Doing so would undermine Canadian democracy no matter how disagreeable the speech is. However, there are obvious steps the Canadian government can take to avoid awkward situations with India. For one, it should recognize that there are bigger human rights issues elsewhere that involve Canada more directly than the farmers’ protests. Criticizing Indian police tactics while selling weapons to Saudi Arabia (whose actions in Yemen have created the world’s greatest humanitarian crisis) does not demonstrate Canada’s commitment to unequivocally standing up for human rights. Ideally, the pay-to-play system should be reformed in favor of a primary system where all voters get to decide on the candidates. 

At the same time, the Indian government should stop overreacting to the public musings of foreign politicians. Only insecure countries worry about what others think of their internal affairs. What the Prime Minister of Canada says about protests in India is not going to reignite the Khalistan movement. Increased Canadian sensitivity to Indian security concerns and decreased Indian reactivity to these statements will enable the two countries to focus on more important issues like trade, climate change, and upholding a rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific.

2020: A Year of Cartographic Warfare in South Asia

Rohan Rajesh

2020 was an eventful year in South Asia. The year kicked off with the anti-CAA protests and the Delhi riots in India. COVID-19 spread through the region, devastating India in particular. The China-India border witnessed the first killings in 40 years, bringing the already tense relationship to historic lows. California Senator Kamala Devi Harris became the first Indian American to be elected Vice-President. The Intra-Afghan talks continued with President Trump rushing to remove the remaining US troops before the end of his term. And, finally, farmers from the Indian states of Punjab and Haryana have been protesting in huge numbers against newly passed laws deregulating agriculture. 

It was a difficult year for everyone, and South Asia is no exception. Some relatively light-hearted moments, however, involved the seriousness with which South Asian countries staked their claims to disputed territories by issuing new maps. While cartographic warfare and propaganda are regular features of South Asian politics, they reached new and humorous heights in 2020.

First, let us take a look at Nepal. In 2019, after reorganizing the borders of the erstwhile state of Jammu and Kashmir, India issued a new map to reflect the change. As expected, Pakistan and China were not pleased with the map, which laid claim to territories controlled by them but long claimed by India. The lesser-known conflagration that developed was between India and Nepal. Nepal lays claim to a small strip of land on its northwest border with India, which includes the Kalapani territory, the Lipulekh pass, and the Limpiyadhura pass. The issue comes from ambiguities in an 1806 treaty signed by the Kingdom of Nepal and the British East India Company (border disputes created by British maps are a theme in this piece). India, however, has controlled the territory since its 1962 war with China. The issue subsided until 2020 when India inaugurated a road that connects India and China through the disputed territory. The road is meant to facilitate the travel of Hindu pilgrims to holy sites in Tibet, but many in Nepal were not pleased, and protests broke out immediately. So, in May, Nepal issued its own map, which for the first time included the disputed territory, angering India. Now, it seems that relations between the two are on the mend, but the seriousness with which these countries take map-making is strange, considering the minuscule nature of the claims and the fact that new maps do not change the de facto situation.

This brings us to the even more shocking map issued in 2020. Last August, Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan unveiled a new map of Pakistan that included Indian-administered Kashmir. What caught the attention of many in India was that the map also included the Indian regions of Junagadh and Manavadar, which are today in the western state of Gujarat (the home state of Prime Minister Modi). When India was partitioned in 1947 by the British, the princely states (semi-autonomous states that recognized British suzerainty) were technically free to choose between India, Pakistan, or independence. In practice, most princely states within India went to India, and most in Pakistan went to Pakistan. There were three exceptions: Jammu and Kashmir, Hyderabad, and Junagadh. The first involved a Hindu ruler of a majority-Muslim population, while the latter two involved Muslim rulers of majority-Hindu populations. Hyderabad was landlocked within India, so India annexed it in 1948. Junagadh was not connected to Pakistan, but it did border the Arabian Sea and so feasibly could have been part of Pakistan just like East Pakistan (Bangladesh today). The Nawab actually acceded to Pakistan, but the Hindu-majority population protested the move.

Complicating the situation was that Junagadh’s three vassal states were split on the decision. The ruler of Manavadar agreed with accession to Pakistan (which is why it was included in Pakistan’s map), while the other two vassals defied the Nawab and chose to accede to India. The Nawab responded with military force, forcing India to intervene. A referendum was held in 1948 in the states, and the people chose to accede to India. Pakistan never accepted the results, but the dispute was forgotten (though it was a major crisis between 1947 and 1948). 

That is, until 2020 . . . maybe. It’s unlikely Pakistan seriously claims Junagadh and Manavadar. The fact that Pakistan never included Junagadh in its maps after 1948 means that Pakistan’s claims are rather pointless. Additionally, the idea of Pakistan was to create a homeland for South Asian Muslims, but Junagadh was Hindu-majority. So, the unveiling of the map was simply a move to irritate India, which it succeeded in doing. 

While these instances have been humorous and insignificant, maps have had real and serious consequences in South Asia since 1947. The British (as usual) were rather terrible at map-making, leading to the current tensions between India, China, Pakistan, Nepal, and Bhutan. 

A lesser-known (but no less deadly) theater of the Kashmir dispute also resulted from cartographic ambiguities. In 1972, the Simla Agreement was signed by India and Pakistan to provide a new framework for dialogue after the two had fought a third war in 1971. The agreement settled the de facto border between the two countries in the disputed Kashmir region, except for one small region: the Siachen glacier. It is a truly desolate high-altitude area, and the makers of the agreement never considered that anyone would seriously covet it. But covet it they did. 

In 1980, the US Defense Mapping Agency included the glacier within the borders of Pakistan. India was not pleased, and the two countries ended up fighting over the glacier, first by sending mountaineering expeditions and then with soldiers and weapons. India ended up with control of the glacier, but both countries continue to suffer heavy casualties largely due to the bitingly cold Himalayan temperatures. The conflict (dubbed the highest battlefield in the world) also gave rise to a new term: oropolitics (“politics of mountains” in Greek). So, have a laugh over the cartographic developments of 2020, bearing in mind the serious consequences the humble map can have.

The North

Joshua O’Brien

We all know that the Earth is warming unsustainably, and the polar bears are dying. Yes, it’s morbid, but it’s true. Despite this, the Arctic is not understood in popular imaginations as an area of interest for foreign policy. Afterall, there is not much up there; you need an icebreaker to navigate it, and for half of the year it promises the world’s worst case of seasonal depression to any mariner who dares to visit. But as climate change slowly advances, this will change.

In fact, it has already started to change. In the last five years, foreign ministries have commented more frequently on the Arctic, with Secretary of State Mike Pompeo noting the region will “present new opportunities” (Hansler, 2019). China has proclaimed itself a “near-Arctic state” in strategy, and has designs for a “Polar Silk Road,” which would cut the cost of shipping to Europe by a third. Russia, a country with the widest stretch of Arctic coastline, has re-emphasized its Northern Fleet in recent strategies.

This narrative makes the Arctic seem like it is already devolving into chaos. It is not. For the past couple of years, the Arctic Council has been able to maintain the region’s peace and stability. There are no immediate border disputes in the region, though international litigation on several sea borders and Exclusive Economic Zones is ongoing. Further, shipping across the Northeast Passage and Northwest Passage have only occurred a couple times, typically with icebreakers, as these passes are not consistently ice-free at this time. It is expected that by 2050, more routine shipping through the region will be possible. Additionally, many countries do not have the infrastructure or resources in place to address the Arctic. The United States, in particular, lacks a strong icebreaker fleet and has limited search and rescue capability north of the Bering Strait. Regardless, the region will become more accessible, and what is now a small issue will become a bigger one.

This geography, and its dramatic shifts, is why the United States, Canada, and other Arctic countries should begin thinking about their resources and policy in the region more in-depth. Of course, I do not make policy for either government, but in particular Arctic states should come to long-term limits on shipping through the region to respect the environment, prevent disasters such as oil spills, and prevent further exacerbations of the climate crisis. It may not be a major issue now, but in the decades to come, I trust that the dark, sleepy Arctic will get more international attention.

Hansler, Jennifer. “Pompeo: Melting sea ice presents 'new opportunities for trade'” CNN, May 7, 2019. cnn.com/2019/05/06/politics/pompeo-sea-ice-arctic-council/index.html.

A Future Without Chocolate

By Anyi Li

Can you imagine a world without chocolate? I know, it sounds awful. However, recent evidence has all pointed to a probable future world without chocolate. 

The primary ingredient within chocolate is cacao--a plant that has an enduring history that we can trace all the way back to the pre-colonial Aztec and Inca Empires. At the time, cacao was a cultural, ceremonial drink that the Native Americans viewed as sacred. It was not meant to mix with sugar, milk, nuts, and fruits. After the European colonization of the Americas, they added sugar into cacao drinks to neutralize the slightly bitter, spicy taste of cacao. It was a drink to which only the very rich had access. It was not until the industrial revolution that people made cacao drinks into widely affordable and popular chocolate bars. Later on, Europeans transformed many African, American, and Asian colonies near the Equator into nationwide plantations with cacao as the cash crop with the expanding western colonialism and imperialism. Even after the post-colonialism today, these regions continue to grow cacao.

Cacao can only grow within 10-15 degrees north and south of the Equator. Yet in recent years, El Nino, an atmospheric phenomenon caused by global warming, has brought extreme rainfall and drought to many regions of the world, hitting the regions near the Equator particularly hard. Many cacao production centers were impacted, including West Africa, Indonesia, and Ecuador. While the demand for chocolate (which also means demand for cacao) grows annually, a 2014 estimate predicts a 250,000 tonnes shortage for cacao worldwide, and 40,000 metric tonnes loss of cacao will occur in Ecuador alone in 2015. Moreover, an Amazonian fungus, otherwise known as the witches-broom disease, has swept Brazil. This fungus destroyed most Brazil’s cacao plantations and infected many former cacao farmers with a skin disorder. Due to this disease, Brazil fell from the second-largest exporter of cacao to only sustainable to its internal national market while still suffering from climate change.

If the witches-broom disease continues to sweep the world, and if the climate continues to change unchecked for the worse, then in the near future, we will very likely face the gloomy reality that we have no chocolate to eat, or at least no chocolate that we can easily afford to eat.

The Plight of Racing to the Bottom

By Anyi Li

Racing to the bottom, which describes a socio-economic phenomenon that governments turn a blind eye to business activities to attract foreign companies, is common to the developing nations, especially in Asia and Africa. Accompanying this intentional negligence is that companies and factories take advantage of these developing nations’ workers in the forms of unfair pay, horrible working conditions, excessively long working hours each day, and even child labor to lower their business costs. People living in the developed and wealthy Global North, shocked by news uncovering the horrendous treatment received by these workers, always assume that governments in developing countries simply do not care about their citizens. Some parts of this assumption may hold true, but it is not the full picture of the story.

Western companies’ underlying reason to manufacture in developing countries is the cheap labor cost. When a certain developing country’s labor cost increases due to increasing living costs and improving living standards, many corporations from the Global North shift their manufacturing centers to countries with even cheaper labor. For instance, in the post-WWII years, Nike manufactured mainly in Japan, but it moved its manufacturing centers to South Korea and Taiwan as labor cost in Japan rose in the 1970s. And in the 1980s, when labor cost again rose in South Korea and Taiwan, Nike shifted to China. Recently, with the Chinese economy and society advancing into higher levels of development, we begin to see the Chinese factory workers’ rising wages drive western companies such as Nike and Apple away to Southeastern Asia. This shift often leaves little time for developing countries to adjust their economies and creates massive unemployment in developing countries. As a result, governments turn a blind eye to their export industries disobeying minimum wage laws and working condition requirements. 

At this point, you may ask: why do developing countries’ governments want to attract western companies in the first place? The simple answer is that these countries have to catch up to the wealthy Global North in development. However, plagued by decades, or even centuries of colonialism, wars, and poverty, they cannot miraculously transform their mostly agrarian society to a fully industrialized, developed one in a few decades when such it has taken the western countries more than a century. And in the current globalized economic environment, it is even harder for them to industrialize, modernize, and lift their people from poverty without opening doors to western companies. To remain competitive against other developing nations, governments in developing countries have little choice but to concede to racing to the bottom.

Terrorism in France and the Hypocrisy of Erdogan and Khan

By Rohan Rajesh

In the middle of October, Samuel Paty, a history teacher, was beheaded by an 18-year-old Chechen refugee. Paty’s crime? Showing Charlie Hebdo’s infamous caricatures of the Prophet Muhammad in class to discuss freedom of expression. Paty had been doing this every year since the Hebdo attacks and consistently allowed Muslim students to exit the classroom during these discussions. You likely remember that Charlie Hebdo journalists were slaughtered by terrorists in Paris in 2015 over those cartoons. 

French President Emmanuel Macron stood by Paty, supported free speech, and refused to condemn the caricatures. Immediately, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan chose to condemn Macron and all of Europe for “Islamophobia” rather than the beheading itself. Erdogan even went so far as to question Macron’s mental health, and calls to boycott French goods have been heard across the Muslim world. 

To be sure, Macron’s comments were likely inevitable given the upcoming presidential election in France. Centrist Macron is a staunch secularist and is neck and neck with far-right candidate Marine Le Pen in the polls. Measures and rhetoric against Islamist terrorism are popular in a country that has suffered 36 Islamic State-inspired attacks in the past eight years, including two that together killed more than 200 people. However, Erdogan’s and Khan’s claim that Macron (and Europe in general) is racist is deeply hypocritical because both have made lives for minorities in their own countries miserable. 

Since taking office in 2000, Erdogan has systematically tried to erase Turkey’s secular and democratic heritage. Most recently, the Turkish government converted the Hagia Sophia (which was first a Byzantine church, then an Ottoman mosque, and then a museum) back into a mosque, ignoring the sentiments of millions of Christians. Apparently, Erdogan does not care about Christianophobia. Erdogan has also continued and intensified the persecution of the Kurdish minority. Many Turks have spoken out against Erdogan’s Islamist policies, but he has sought to crush that dissent with an iron fist. Erdogan’s comments conveniently come in the face of a sinking Turkish economy and tensions with France and NATO over policy in Libya, Nagorno-Karabakh, Syria, and Turkey’s exploration of natural resources in disputed Mediterranean waters. 

Pakistan’s Imran Khan – a frequent ally of Erdogan – is no better. While condemning Islamophobia in India and the West, he has stood by while Pakistanis of several minority faiths (including Christians, Hindus, Shi’ites, and Ahmadiyyas) continue to be persecuted. However, it should come as no surprise that Khan condemns blaspheming against Islam when Pakistan’s religious minorities continue to be terrorized by the country’s notorious blasphemy laws. While Khan sought to lecture Macron on the correct way to prevent radicalization, Pakistan has been a hearth for radical groups since at least the 1970s. Khan (known to his critics as “Taliban Khan”) consistently lets hardline Islamist groups dictate policy whenever they violently protest. For example, when the government added internationally renowned Princeton University economics professor Atif Mian to the PM’s Economic Advisory Council, hardline Islamist groups opposed the move, and the government made Mian resign. The reason for this controversy? Mian belonged to the heavily persecuted Ahmadiyya sect of Islam, whom hardline Muslims (and the Constitution of Pakistan) consider heretics. 

Finally, while Erdogan and Khan have criticized perceived wrongs committed against French Muslims by Macron, their studious silence on the Chinese Communist Party’s real cultural genocide of Uyghurs goes beyond hypocrisy – it is reprehensible. The case of Turkey is particularly shocking given that Uyghurs are also a Turkic people. Erdogan refused to sign on to resolutions from 22 countries (including NATO allies) and Turkish opposition parties condemning China’s treatment of the Uyghurs. Worse still, an explosive report by The Telegraph revealed that the Turkish government was deporting Uyghur dissidents to third countries who, in turn, deported them to China. Axios and NPR also revealed that Turkish authorities harassed Uyghur dissidents for speaking out against the CCP’s abuses. These dissidents sought refuge in a fellow Turkic, Muslim country and were betrayed.

Why the silence of two leaders who claim to be Muslim leaders and condemn Islamophobia everywhere else? Perhaps it’s because of the billions of dollars China is pouring into Turkey and Pakistan through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Maybe it’s because China does not care about both countries’ authoritarian tendencies as long as they keep the West and India, respectively, on edge. Either way, their condemnation of Macron’s policies in open, democratic France is laughable if they do not condemn one of the worst human rights crises against Muslims in the 21st century.

Leaders like Erdogan and Khan often seek to distinguish between radical Islamism and Islam. Yet their intolerance for free speech and illiberal actions at home are not helping Islam’s image. All major religions are facing a crisis of radicalization and hate, and Islam is no exception. Further, their conditional condemnation of Islamophobia and refusal to condemn terrorism, while unsurprising, discredit any legitimate criticism of the French government’s policy towards French Muslims. If Erdogan and Khan want to improve Islam’s image and secure their mantle as leaders of a modern, global, Islamic society, they had best clean up their own backyards and speak out against human rights abuses for all people everywhere no matter the cost.

Kashmir: How Violence Begets Violence

By Rohan Rajesh 

On October 27th, 2020, three members of India’s ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) were shot dead in the Kashmir Valley by a militant group known as The Resistance Front (TRF). The Indian government believes that the TRF is a front for the Pakistan-based UN-designated terrorist group Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), which was responsible for the 2008 Mumbai attacks. The killings come days after the Indian government removed domicile restrictions for Jammu & Kashmir, which would allow non-Kashmiri Indians to buy land in the territory. 

This controversial move comes more than a year after the even more controversial move in which the Indian government removed the erstwhile state’s autonomy, demoted it to a union territory, and plunged the Kashmir Valley into a strict security lockdown and widespread internet shutdown. That move came six months after the devastating Pulwama attack against Indian soldiers, which helped propel Prime Minister Narendra Modi to a second term in a landslide. Notice a pattern? Kashmir is the perfect case study in how violence begets violence and on what not to do to achieve your political goals.

When India was a British possession, India was governed through a combination of direct rule and cooptation with native rulers in “Princely States.” One of these states was Jammu & Kashmir. The diverse region includes many ethnic groups (one of whom are Kashmiris). Although the region is majority Muslim, there are also significant populations of Hindus and Sikhs (especially in Jammu) and Tibetan Buddhists (in Ladakh). When the British decided to partition their possessions into Muslim-majority Pakistan and Hindu-majority India, the princely states were given a choice between joining both countries. Most Muslim-majority princely states joined Pakistan, and most Hindu-majority princely states joined India. There were three exceptions: Hyderabad, Junagadh, and Jammu & Kashmir. 

Hyderabad and Junagadh were Hindu-majority but ruled by Muslim kings. They were annexed by India. The latter was Muslim-majority but ruled by a Hindu Dogra king. The king was unpopular among many Muslims in the state. The king did not want to join either India or Pakistan and wanted the state to become an independent country like Nepal and Bhutan. Pakistan eventually lost patience and sent Pashtun tribesmen and irregular Pakistani forces to annex the region. The king requested help from India to repulse the invasion in exchange for the state’s accession to India. The result was the First Indo-Pakistan War. India ended up with two-thirds of the state (including the Muslim-majority Kashmir Valley), while Pakistan ended up with the remaining third.

During the war, the UN Security Council issued a resolution that called for Pakistan to first remove all Pakistanis from the state. India would then progressively reduce the number of Indian troops, and a plebiscite was to be held. Neither government accepted these proposals. The Pakistani government was concerned that a referendum would lead to the state’s accession to India because of the human rights abuses committed by the tribesmen against the locals. These anti-Pakistan sentiments were reflected in a speech by Kashmiri political leader Sheikh Abdullah in which he bitterly accused Pakistan of “[wanting] to force [Kashmir] into a position of slavery” and said that Hitler and Goebbels had “transmigrated their souls into Pakistan.”

To maintain peace in the region, India agreed to add Article 370 and Article 35A to the Indian Constitution, which gave the state a measure of autonomy. As part of this autonomy, the state had the right to decide who is a permanent resident and deny land to other Indians (these are the domicile laws). Additionally, laws passed by the Indian Parliament did not immediately apply to the state, including several progressive policies on caste and gender equality. Ever since the Constitution was passed, the Indian government has been chipping away at that autonomy, but most of the important provisions, including the domicile laws, remained. For the most part, the region was peaceful. When Pakistan started the second Indo-Pakistan war in 1965, a major miscalculation on the part of Pakistani military planners was the assumption that Kashmiris would rise up against the Indian government, which did not happen.

Things changed in 1989. The Indian government was accused of rigging the local elections to favor a more pro-India candidate. Disaffected Kashmiri youth joined separatist movements fighting for independence, but Pakistan had other plans. Pakistan, drawing from its successful experiment of using radical groups in Afghanistan, began to support jihadis from Pakistan, who eventually overshadowed the local movement. These jihadis wanted Kashmir to join Pakistan. The result was disastrous for the Kashmir Valley. Kashmiri Hindus were forcibly expelled from their ancient homeland by radical Islamist groups. The Pakistan-backed violence begot a stronger Indian response, and the 1990s ended up being a brutal period in the Kashmir insurgency in which more than 40,000 people died.

The War on Terror let India justify its crackdown in terms of counterinsurgency. It did not help that many of these Pakistan-backed groups committed horrific attacks against not only Indians but also Westerners. Eventually, like other militant movements across India, the situation in Kashmir began to settle down. But, in 2016, the Indian military killed the militant Burhan Wani, the popular leader of the Hizbul Mujahideen. Massive protests ensued in the Valley, pitting stone-pelting youth against armed Indian police forces. This ended exactly as one would expect: the blinding of many protesters by pellets, a rise in militant attacks, and more crackdowns. The situation further worsened in 2019 with the Pulwama attack and the Indian Parliament’s decision to remove Kashmir’s autonomy. 

Surprisingly, that move had the support of many opposition parties, along with BJP-allied parties. Although Kashmiris will still have the same representation in Parliament, their say in many matters is subject to central approval, and autonomy is probably a foregone conclusion. The situation has since simmered, and the recent change to Kashmir’s domicile law and the killings of local BJP politicians may be the start of a new wave of violence. 

The irony is that in seeking freedom, Kashmiris have instead seen their rights dwindled and autonomy eliminated. Ultimately, Kashmiris need to convince Indians of the righteousness of their cause. Perhaps if Kashmiris had persisted with peaceful demonstrations in the face of a violent security crackdown, their cause would have gained much more sympathy nationally and internationally. For all of its flaws, India is a multiparty, pluralistic democracy with a national conscience that is receptive to persistent peaceful protest. After all, Gandhian methods are how India itself gained global sympathy got independence from a tyrannical Britain.

But the failure of Kashmiris to gain any sympathy lies in the fact that many non-Kashmiri Indians are fed up with the situation. Unlike other recent controversies, this issue is not a Hindu-Muslim issue. The Jamiat Ulema-e-Hind, for example, fully supported the removal of Kashmir’s autonomy. Its General-Secretary stated in Hindustani, “Kashmir was ours, is ours, and will remain ours.” The expulsion of Kashmiri Hindus, multiple terrorist attacks, and the continued support of Pakistan led many Indians to support any change in the status quo, including the previously unthinkable removal of Kashmiri autonomy. Until activists realize this, violence will simply beget more violence in Kashmir.

Foreign Relations of the Holy See

By Joshua O’Brien

First, the issue of terminology—in international law, the sovereign entity to which we would refer to as The Vatican—the seat of the Catholic Church—is actually the Holy See, not the Vatican City State. The Holy See is considered a non-state sovereign entity, with full control over the territory of the Vatican. But Vatican City, as a state, does not have international sovereignty. The Holy See, which can be thought of as the governing body of the global Catholic Church, does.

That terminology seems superfluous or redundant, but in evaluating foreign relations, it is actually a necessary exposition. The foreign relations of the Holy See are not focused on the concerns of territorial states—the issues the Vatican presents are more philosophical, humanitarian, and peace-oriented. Befitting of a religion with over a billion faithful.

The Holy See has relations with all of the recognized UN member states, save the People’s Republic of China, as well as with Palestine and the Republic of China. It has embassy equivalents termed apostolic nunciatures, and even a Cardinal Secretary of State. It is through these organs that the Holy See brings its concerns and ideas—typically very Catholic ideas—to states. In the United States, the Holy See’s political interests were typically on issues of morality and abortion. In recent years, and especially following the 2015 state visit of Pope Francis I, the Holy See has also been advocating for climate action.

International organizations, including the United Nations, accord the Holy See permanent observer status. Its representatives consistently attend General Assembly meetings and have been able to provide advice and sway outcomes on certain issues. Additionally, the Holy See is recognized as being able to ratify international treaties under international law. Often these take the form of concordats, bilateral agreements between countries that cover issues of the Catholic Church’s operation in particular countries.

This only scratches the surface, but regardless, the Holy See (read: leaders of the Catholic Church) is an important geopolitical entity. It has sway on issues, and its leaders make state visits comparable to those of a President. Popes even address joint sessions of Congress! Of course, everyone knows that the Catholic Church has political influence, given the sheer number of Catholics and how they might influence politics. This was a point of contention for the Presidential run of John F. Kennedy, and some pointed to it during the confirmation of Amy Coney Barrett to the U.S. Supreme Court. But rarely is it fully acknowledged how strong of an influence the Holy See, as an institution, has in actual diplomatic proceedings. It brings a whole new conception to “Peace be with you”

1,455 Days Later

By Joshua O’Brien

It seems natural, as I read polls and election news over my morning coffee, to remember the state of the world four years ago. That world, and that race, seem so far away.

Back in 2016, the economy was good, but not great. The recovery from the Great Recession was slow, especially following the 2010 turn to austerity politics in the European Union, and debt policies in America. But by 2016 the Recession seemed to be behind us, and things were improving. At least on the macro level. Many still suffer from a decline in real buying power, and that has not changed much for the better in the last four years. And I suspect that if there was not a pandemic, the economic discourse in 2020 would be similar to 2016.

The outlook of international relations has changed, somewhat. In 2016, the United States was especially fixated on terrorism. The Islamic State had earlier gained control of swaths of land in the Levant, and inspired attacks in Paris, Brussels, and San Bernardino. Today, the Islamic State still exists, but holds no territory and has fallen out of the public mind, for the most part. Additionally, the Iran Nuclear Deal has fallen out of the mainstream dialogue, following President Trump’s withdrawal from the deal. Other issues of international relations from 2016 remain. Brexit is still ongoing, and sharp language from American politicians regarding China has coalesced into more aggressive policy and thoughts towards China inside of the United States. This includes the trade war begun in 2018.

In other regards, we are in a very different place. American standing with traditional North Atlantic allies has diminished in recent years due to the policies and rhetoric of President Trump. Global efforts to address the increasingly existential threat of climate change have also been reversed, as have trade agreements, such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership.

Of course, all of these issues feel far away in the middle of the pandemic. While the 2016 election took place amongst relatively normal times, if increasingly dark in tone, the 2020 election is occurring in the midst of an economic downturn attached to the worst respiratory disease outbreak in 100 years. It’s a dramatic shift in political climate and shows just how much can change—domestically and abroad—in four years. It also reminds me that elections, in America and the world, can affect the international political scene for years. I’m going to be thinking about that, along with so much else, sitting alone in front of my television on Tuesday night.

Global Pandemic, Same Conspiracy Theory

By Anyi Li

The year 2020 is indeed an “annus horribilis” for the world, brought about by an unexpected novel coronavirus -- COVID-19 -- sweeping the globe. Unfortunately, the two greatest superpowers and the most avid competitors for world dominance -- the United States and China -- both failed to lead the world in this global crisis. China is where the COVID-19 was first found, and the United States is currently the worst-infected nation in the world. Though no one could have foreseen a pandemic, many leadership failures in both countries undoubtedly aided the rapid spread of the virus. During this time, conspiracy theories, promoted by the Chinese and American governing administration, went viral. 

Yet whether you are in the U.S. or in China, you will hear a conspiracy theory with the exact same content, but only the subject switched. This theory is that the virus is intentionally brooded and released to the world from a lab sponsored by the American/Chinese government. Somehow, both sides manage to scrabble fractions of evidence from different places and present a seemingly credible doctrine, especially to people who already have xenophobia and prejudices rooted consciously and subconsciously, resulting from growing up media propagandizing against foreign countries.

Although one authoritarian and the other democratic, the two administrations obviously share the same agenda: to deflect attention and blame from themselves to foreign nations, like leaders throughout history had hoped to accomplish when they, to some degree, failed to respond to a national crisis. For instance, even though it, later on, removed many corrupt officials who were slow to respond to the COVID-19 crisis from office as a punishment for their misconduct, the Chinese government continues to try to avoid mentioning that it is the Chinese government’ undemocratic structure that enabled the provincial government to delay and temporarily conceal information from the Chinese citizens and the Chinese central government. On the other hand, the American government hopes to prevent Americans from learning that even though the Chinese government delayed publicizing information about a novel coronavirus within China, it has not lied to the world as many in America believe. In fact, China began to regularly update the virus with the World Health Organization as early as January 3,  only a week after the report of the first case of pneumonia of unknown cause. Moreover, the Chinese CDC briefed the U.S. CDC about COVID-19 on January 4, released the genetic sequence of COVID-19 on January 10, and implemented a very strict lockdown on Wuhan on January 23, 2020. With just this simple timeline, Americans could rightfully blame no one but its own government’s short-sightedness, arrogance, and slow-response toward the so-called “China-virus,” which have led to a death toll surpassing the U.S. death toll in WWI, Korean War, and Vietnam War combined.

In conclusion, amidst this global pandemic, both an authoritarian and a democratic country’s governments’ leaders use the same conspiracy theory with minimal scientific evidence to cover up the weaknesses specific to each of them: China’s nondemocracy and the United States’ incompetence. 

Bangladesh and the Dangers of Racism and Ignorance

By Rohan Rajesh 

While post-war American history is filled with examples of American leaders turning a blind eye to genocide, examples of America deliberately supporting a government committing genocide are not well known. The idea that this country, founded on basic liberties, would do so is unfathomable. But it did happen as recently as the 1970s, and it is important that we learn about it to prevent it from happening later. This is the story of the genocide in Bangladesh.

In 1947, British India was partitioned into Hindu-majority India and Muslim-majority Pakistan. Initially, Pakistan consisted of two entities separated by thousands of miles of Indian territory: West Pakistan and East Pakistan. West Pakistan consisted of Punjabis, Sindhis, Pashtuns, Balochis, and several small ethnic groups. Since the establishment of Pakistan, the lingua franca of these diverse groups has been the Urdu language. East Pakistan, on the other hand, consisted largely of Bengalis. Bengalis have a history quite separate from that of West Pakistan. Unlike the languages of West Pakistan, which use Perso-Arabic-derived scripts, Bengali uses an Indic script. Whereas the languages of West Pakistan have copious borrowings of Arabic and Persian, Bengali language and literature use Sanskrit as its higher language. Linguistic nationalism would become the major centrifugal force in Pakistan.

Efforts to make Urdu the sole national and official language generated significant protests in East Pakistan. The overthrow of the democratic government by the mostly Punjabi military alienated many Bengalis. Bengalis complained about racism and exploitation at the hands of their counterparts in the West. In 1970, the Bhola cyclone devastated East Pakistan. The West Pakistani government delayed relief efforts, leading to widespread condemnation in East Pakistan and internationally. East Pakistani leaders demanded greater autonomy to no avail.

In 1971, the Pakistani military decided to allow general elections for the first time in Pakistan’s history. The East Pakistan-based Awami League, led by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, won nearly all the seats in East Pakistan (the more populous of the two provinces). In West Pakistan, however, seats were divided between the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), led by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, and various conservative parties. The result was that the Awami League won a majority in the National Assembly.

Fearing a Bengali-dominated government, President Yahya Khan (who was formerly the army chief) and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto refused to inaugurate the National Assembly. The government also refused to grant East Pakistan autonomy. This led many Bengalis to demand an independent Bangladesh. The military responded with Operation Searchlight, which aimed to crush dissent in the East by targeting Bengali intellectuals, students, and Hindus. Outraged Bengali officers mutinied and moved to India, where they formed the Mukti Bahini (Bengali for “freedom fighters”). During the genocide, millions of Bengalis were internally displaced, millions fled to India, hundreds of thousands of Bengali women were raped, and millions were killed. India, led by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, grew increasingly concerned with the situation. The refugee crisis had placed a severe strain on India’s resources. Gandhi urged Nixon to use America’s friendship with the Pakistani regime to help solve the issue, but Cold War politics prevented any quick solution to the issue

Despite widespread condemnation of the Pakistani military, including from the US Consulate in East Pakistan, Congress, and several prominent musicians (who launched the famous Concert for Bangladesh), the Nixon administration supported Pakistan because they saw Pakistan as important to opening relations with China. Meanwhile, India, while nominally non-aligned, had signed a friendship treaty with the Soviet Union, and Gandhi’s socialist policies amplified concerns in the Nixon administration. 

Despite Congress’s ban on weapons sales to Pakistan, Nixon maneuvered to give the Pakistani military Americans weapons, which the regime used to slaughter civilians. In an attempt to dissuade India from attempting a direct military intervention, Nixon sent the Seventh Fleet into the Bay of Bengal, but this fleet was checked by the Soviets, who dispatched a fleet in response. In the end, Pakistan sealed its fate by preemptively conducting airstrikes on Indian airbases along the western border. India used the airstrikes as an excuse to declare war on Pakistan and easily liberated East Pakistan in just 13 days. The nation of Bangladesh was born at a devastating cost.

Recently released tapes also revealed the sheer racism of the Nixon administration. Nixon declared his loathing of Indians and Bengalis to Kissinger. Whether his racism had any bearing on his policy or was simply a disgusting expression of his frustration with the situation is hard to say. Regardless, while presidential racism is dangerous, ignorance and antipathy are worse. 

The Bangladesh genocide is not taught in most US or world history textbooks despite being an important part of both. Further, Bangladesh is only one example of a genocide the US could have prevented. During the 1960s, a genocide took place in Indonesia with tacit US support. Twenty years later, the genocide in Rwanda could have been prevented. Now, genocide is taking place in Xinjiang, and nothing substantive has been done in response. In Yemen, the Trump administration gave weapons to Saudi Arabia to fight the Houthis despite the horrific human rights situation created by the Saudi intervention. 

America can longer ignore genocide. Although the US cannot intervene everywhere, America’s global influence (financial and military) means it can probably prevent several genocides. Additionally, genocide studies need to be taught in high schools either as an important part of history classes or as a separate social sciences class so that the next generation can prevent the next disaster before it is too late.