Genocide Olympics

Jennings Dixon

I love the Olympics. I look forward to seeing so many countries around the world come together and compete. The Olympics always projects an astounding message of unity while also displaying the world’s greatest feats of athleticism. And with the pandemic having postponed Tokyo’s summer Olympics back a year, we will get two Olympic games in a six-month period.

This summer, we get to watch swimming, diving, tennis, etc. in Tokyo. Then in January, figure skating, snowboarding, and curling in Beijing. I personally was surprised to hear that Beijing would be hosting the Winter Olympics. It feels like I was watching the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympics just yesterday, so it’s strange to have the same city host again so soon. Some aren’t happy that China is hosting after a quick turnaround; others aren’t happy for more serious reasons.

China’s government is not the poster child for justice and equality. In recent years, Xi Jinping and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) have committed serious atrocities to various groups and regions in and outside its borders. From silencing Tibet to squashing democracy in Hong Kong, Xi has been ruthless to those who create dissent or difference to the CCP and their views. One horrific example of this is in western China in Xinjiang with the Uyghur minority group.

Uyghurs are a Muslim ethnic group that lives in the autonomous region of Xinjiang. They make up nearly 50 percent of the population there. Uyghurs have been subjected to appalling abuses, including mass surveillance, indoctrination, and forced sterilization. There are Uyghur concentration camps. Uyghurs are victims of genocide. Xi and the CCP are leading these oppressive efforts, and have not received any serious consequences from anyone on the world stage.

As Xi and the CCP prepare to host the Winter Olympics, many human rights organizations are calling for boycotts. They believe that by allowing China to host the games, it sends China the message that the atrocities they are committing are acceptable. By boycotting and petitioning to have them moved elsewhere, it shows that the world does not condone such human rights violations. Some leaders of the International Olympic Committee (IOC) are downplaying the tragedies, and think that the Olympics should not be about politics or making a statement.

I personally disagree with the IOC. I think it’s dangerous to let a government actively committing genocide host a unity event like the Olympics. We saw it in 1936 when Berlin hosted. Hitler and the Nazis became the center of the world stage, which helped validate them as leaders, and ultimately warrant genocide of the Jewish population. It’s destructive and it’s alarming. I don’t think it’s ever a good idea to doubt what a leader like Xi can do.

This leaves me asking the question: what can we do? And I’m honestly not sure. I think the athletes have a bigger burden to bear. Do they go to the Olympics and compete? Fulfill what they have dreamed and worked for their entire lives? Or do they sit it out to protest an oppressive regime? Do such symbolic acts really affect change, or are they just merely for show? These are not easy questions to answer, and I’m glad my athleticism is not Olympic material, because this would tear me apart.

Impact of COVID-19 Lockdowns among the Vietnamese Population

James McClure

Despite Vietnam’s COVID-19 vulnerability due to geographical proximity to China as well as its under-resourced public health sector, the nation has successfully avoided a catastrophic surge of coronavirus cases. By utilizing the authority of the single-party central government to detect and isolate cases early on as well as provide clear and consistent health messages to citizens. Significant mismanagement of the 2003-4 SARS epidemic caused the Vietnamese government and population to be more cognizant of the risks of rapid COVID-19 transmission. While the prompt government response prevented mass casualties, particularly among the most epidemiologically vulnerable, PTSD, anxiety, and depression have still impacted millions of Vietnamese people.

As a result of lockdown restrictions, schools, language centers, as well as many other nonessential businesses have been shut down. Loss of income and the ensuing economic uncertainty has created intense anxiety for millions of Vietnamese people who have lost work during this pandemic. These restrictions have also placed additional stress upon people who wish to immigrate to Vietnam. The Vietnamese government has virtually banned all entry of foreign nationals to prevent the spread of the disease over borders, which has forced people who wish to enter the nation to do so by illegal means. Immigrants who successfully enter Vietnam are likely to experience severe negative mental health outcomes, due to lack of access to the nation’s health care system.

Buddhism and Nationalism

Rohan Rajesh

Of all the major world religions that have fallen to virulent nationalism, the fall of Buddhism was particularly surprising. After all, Buddhism eschews fervent nationalism because that would entail attachment to something, even if it is an abstract, modern concept like the nation-state. Further, Buddhism is quite unambiguous on the question of violence – abstaining from violence is the right path. Yet, one of the genocides being committed today is occurring in Myanmar, a country whose population is around 88% Buddhist. In Sri Lanka, another majority Buddhist country, a surge in Sinhalese Buddhist majoritarianism threatens to unleash a repeat of one of South Asia’s deadliest conflicts. 

For a faith that was revolutionary in its ideals of equality, compassion, and ending suffering, the actions of Buddhist nationalists is shocking and disturbing. If these deadly impulses can take hold in one of the most peaceful religions in the world, what hope is there for the rest of us? It is therefore important to ascertain the origins of Buddhist nationalism and the potential consequences for nationalism in other religions.

For much of medieval history, Buddhism was a persecuted religion, particularly with the Turko-Muslim invasions of North India. Buddhism had been in decline before the Muslim invasions due to competition with revitalized Hindu philosophies, but Hindu kings continued to support Buddhist institutions, such as monasteries and universities. The Muslim conquest of Afghanistan and the establishment of the Delhi Sultanate in North India eliminated that patronage. The destruction of the ancient monastery-university of Nalanda by the forces of General Bakhtiyar Khalji of the Delhi Sultanate all but eliminated Buddhism from its traditional Indian hearth. At the same time, Hindu-Buddhist dynasties in Indonesia and Malaysia were replaced by Muslim ones. To be fair, in Southeast Asia most scholars believe this process was peaceful and a result of trade. At the same time, Hinduism continues to thrive in Bali and the Ramayana and Mahabharata (the two great Hindu epics) are extremely popular throughout the region. Still, this fraught history and the declining global Buddhist population (currently only 7% of the world population) have fed into this narrative of Buddhism disappearing due to the spread of Islam, which has fed into hysterical anti-Muslim sentiment in Myanmar and Sri Lanka. The 2001 destruction of the Bamiyan Buddha statues in Afghanistan by the Taliban did not help erase those anxieties.

The violence against Rohingyas in Myanmar and the rise of Sinhalese Buddhist nationalism also have specific local factors. In Myanmar, the Rohingya (as well as Muslims in general) are associated with Bengali migrants who came from British India when Myanmar was also under British rule. During British rule in the subcontinent, there was significant resentment among locals against Indian migrants, Muslim or otherwise. This is why Rohingyas are consistently demonized and referred to as “illegal immigrants” and “Bengalis” – doing so enables locals to “other” the Rohingyas and justify their ethnic cleansing. The Myanmar military (which effectively controls the country) also incites these passions to divide the population and cement its control. This is similar to how the Japanese military co-opted Buddhism to radicalize the population before World War II.

In Sri Lanka, Sinhalese Buddhist nationalism traditionally targeted the Tamil minority. Originally, conflict between the Sinhalese (who are mostly Buddhist) and Tamils (who are mostly Hindu) was largely ethnic in nature. The end of the Sri Lankan Civil War led Sinhalese Buddhist nationalists to find another group to fuel their anger. Muslims became a convenient target for multiple reasons: most of them speak Tamil, many are business owners, and there has been a rise in conservative Salafist influence in the community. The 2019 Easter bombings did not help the situation though anti-Muslim riots had occurred earlier in 2018.

Although Buddhism, unlike other major religions, consistently and unequivocally opposes violence in any situation, ethnic nationalism allows Buddhism to be coopted not as a religion but as a marker of cultural identity. Indeed, the rise in Buddhist nationalism is explained by factors familiar to us in the West – an insecure majority population. As Madison noted in Federalist 10, when one group comprises the majority of the population of a country, it is easy for minorities to become persecuted. I believe that regional integration is a potential solution to the problem of ethnic nationalism. When no group forms a majority of the population, every group can be protected. However, that is a long-term solution. In the short-term, the international community needs to monitor and sanction individuals and groups who perpetrate violence. However, given the strategic importance of Myanmar and Sri Lanka in great power competition in the Indo-Pacific, it is unlikely that that will happen. It should be noted that many moderate Buddhist monks have spoken out against anti-minority violence and authoritarianism in Myanmar and Sri Lanka. Such forces should be supported and provided larger platforms to preserve ethnoreligious peace and to prevent one of the most radically peaceful philosophies this world has seen from becoming a by-word for ethnocentric violence.

Qatar: A Stunning Reversal of Fortune

Robert Cole

The Biden administration’s recent decision to suspend US support for the Saudi led coalition in Yemen probably does not automatically make most people think about Qatar. A tiny Gulf state with a population of less than three million, few people in the West likely think about it at all. Yet with the election of Joe Biden as American president, and particularly with his course change on Yemen, few countries have gained more in such a short span. Only a few months ago, Qatar’s position in the Middle East was less than ideal. Under embargo by four of its regional allies, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the UAE, and Egypt, it was being forced to turn to Iran and Turkey for investment. Now it finds itself released from the embargo, a more diversified economy and a potential regional power broker. How did this happen? 

First, it is important to understand the regional dynamics it exists within. The Middle East has four major Muslim powers, namely Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey, and Iran. While much ink has been spilled in the contention between Saudi and Iran, all four are constantly vying for regional influence and have competing interests, particularly since the Arab Spring in 2011. The uprisings themselves are where Qatar enters the picture. The Qatari government supported many of the anti-government groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood that took to the streets that year, in stark contrast to its conventional allies in the Saudi-led faction. It is important to note though that when Yemen erupted into violence in 2014, it stood with the Saudis in intervening on behalf of government forces. However, its cozy relationship with proponents of the Arab Spring such as the Muslim Brotherhood and its ties to Iran resulted in the Egyptian and Saudi-led embargo beginning in 2017. This left an extremely messy political situation, where Qatar was at once aligned with the Saudis against the Houthis in Yemen, with the Turks in supporting the Muslim Brotherhood, and in relations with Iran over a few commercial and political issues. Tacit American support for the anti-Qatar embargo essentially held the whole situation at a standstill, consigning the tiny Gulf state to an unenviable political position. 

Then came the 2020 US presidential election. President Trump had invested heavily in a relationship with Saudi Arabia, which along with the kingdom’s poor track record on democracy and human rights left it with few friends in the Democratic Party. Faced with the prospect of a US administration much less likely to be permissive of its bad behavior and fearing a Qatari embrace of Iran, the Saudis and their allies ended the embargo on Qatar shortly before President Biden was sworn into office. This was the first major win and it brought an added bonus: economic independence. Before the embargo, Qatar was effectively dependent on its Arab neighbors for basic goods such as milk, but the extended suspension of trade forced it to become self-sufficient, thereby removing a political bludgeon from the Saudi arsenal. The less pro-Saudi presidency also meant a curtailing of American support for the coalition in Yemen, announced at the beginning of February. The implication here is that major arms sales to the UAE and the Saudis will come under greater scrutiny from American officials, but the decision very significantly does not affect Qatar, a country that still has a stake in Yemen, as we previously noted. 

Qatar then has a trinity of advantages in 2021 that could make it a serious regional player. Economically, it escaped a damaging embargo and diversified its economy. Militarily, it picked up an advantage in arms supply from the US and made itself appealing to a new administration looking to put some distance between itself and the Saudi/Emirati coalition. It enjoys good relations with Iran, a key target of US diplomacy, without becoming an Iranian proxy. Freed from the thrall of any one regional hegemon and possessing a strong hand to play, Qatar could be a serious power broker in the Middle East and a valuable ally for years to come.

Mental Health of Migrant Workers on the Myanmar-Thailand Border

James McClure

According to recent estimates, more than 2.4 million migrant workers reside in Thailand. The majority of these workers arrived from the neighboring nation of Thailand, and many do not obtain any type of legitimate registration for their residency. Unfortunately, employers rarely respect the human rights of these migrants, as researchers characterize unsafe working conditions and abusive behavior by employers as “systematic and institutionalized” within this region. In a study examining the mental health of migrant workers in Thailand, the most common stressors across industries were identified as being forced to work overtime or while sick, as well as verbal abuse.

Health policy created by the Thai government has done little to aid the situation of these migrants. While registered migrant workers can legally access national healthcare, unregistered workers face cultural and linguistic barriers to receiving proper treatment. Government health clinics are generally inaccessible to unregistered migrant workers, as they often require the presentation of a work visa to receive treatment. NGO clinics are not always an effective solution either, as migrants are often subject to long wait times for treatment in comparison to private clinics. While some employers provide health insurance for workers, low-wage positions that are occupied by migrants rarely provide this opportunity. Even in situations where migrants have proper access to Thai healthcare, physical health is prioritized over mental health treatment. 

Canada’s Ban on Single-Use Plastics

Zoe Hatsios

Canada is known for being the stereotypical ‘friendly neighbor’ of the United States - it’s looking like  the term will extend over the Atlantic soon enough as well. What started as one of Prime Minister Trudeau’s campaign promises is set to bring full effect in 2021, just the first step of the government’s plan to achieve zero plastic waste by 2030.

So what was this monumental move? Canada banned single-use plastics (products designed to be used once and then disposed of, including plastic grocery bags, straws, stir sticks, six-pack rings, cutlery, and hard-to-recycle foodware). As of 2020, Kenya has the strictest ban - and 34 other countries have some sort of ban as well.

Countries are banning these products because they are incredibly harmful pollutants, especially for aquatic life. Canadians alone produce an estimated 3.3 million tons of plastic waste per year, and more than one-third of plastics are created for single-use.

These products have an average usage-life of 15 minutes, yet have the ability to kill over 1 million marine animals annually. This begs the question: why aren’t single-use plastics at least partially banned everywhere? Shockingly, some states in the US have legislation that preemptively prohibits bans on plastics. As with most environmental issues, there is a clear zero-sum cost-benefit calculation between economic/capitalist expansion and environmental dangers.

If several more European countries follow the trend of Canada, France, and the UK, for instance, it may suggest that the United States may take some efforts to follow suit. Especially in an era where every move China makes could propel Xi’s empire ahead of the US economy, it has become increasingly important for America to stay one step ahead in these types of matters. Only time will tell, but hopefully this news could provide an (although dim) light at the end of the tunnel.

I’ve linked some pages that will be worth your while to read, especially if you’d like more information on the topic. This is a hefty subject, but hopefully these quick facts were a helpful beginning to more thoughtful analysis on how this issue will be handled moving forward, and how environmental politics may have a future impact on international relations.

https://www.chatelaine.com/news/canada-single-use-plastic-ban-faq/

https://oceana.ca/en/blog/canadas-plastic-problem-sorting-fact-fiction

https://www.nationalgeographic.com/environment/2019/08/map-shows-the-complicated-landscape-of-plastic-bans/#close

https://plasticoceans.org/the-facts/#:~:text=We%20are%20producing%20over%20380,at%20least%20several%20hundred%20years.

2,357 Arabian Nights Later, Biden is Turning a New Leaf in Yemen

Jay Ramesh

2,357 days and nights. That’s how long the Yemeni Civil War has been raging on for.

Though the war is still far from being over, the Biden administration has made moves to change US Trump-era outlooks in Yemen. On Friday, Secretary of State Antony Blinken announced that the US will revoke the official designation of terrorist group from the Houthis by February 16. The move will not exempt the Houthis from US economic sanctions, but it will allow the supply of food, medical supplies, and other relief aid to resume flowing into Yemen. 

This announcement signifies a significant shift away from Trump-era policy on Yemen, and subsequently on Iran. Former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo officially designated the Houthis, rebel insurgents fighting against the de jure Yemeni government, as a terrorist organization on January 19. The label prevented people affiliated with the Houthis from accessing any financial support, material, or other purchases affiliated with American institutions.

So food and other supplies can flow into Yemen again, great. But what’s the big picture here?

Well, the Trump administration’s policy towards the Middle East was marked by a general strategy of aggressive containment towards Iran. This manifested itself in sanctions on Iran, withdrawal of the US from the 2015 Iran Nuclear Deal, and attempts to squeeze Iran out of supporting its allies in several proxy conflicts throughout the Middle East. By taking an aggressive stance towards Iran, the administration also tightened its relationship with Saudi Arabia, Iran’s number 1 adversary in the region.

And of course by “tightened its relationship”, I mean that the administration basically wrote the Saudi government blank checks to conduct a proxy war in Yemen.

The Biden administration has been working to change that narrative, and this shift in policy could signal a completely new approach to US foreign relations in the Middle East. Biden has already announced that the US will end its support for Saudi Arabia’s offensive operations in Yemen. Taking a step back from Trump’s hardline approach to Iran, and subsequently its close alignment with the Saudis, opens the door for a more, dare I say it, humanitarian approach to relations and conflicts in the Middle East.
Easing pressure on Iran and withdrawing support for the Saudi’s offensives in Yemen does not mean that the US is moving towards diplomatic isolationism, or that it’s showing weakness. Rather, Biden’s tougher and more principled approach to the Saudis has helped ease tensions in the region, furthering US interests in the region. The Saudis had effectively blockaded Qatar for 3 years, but Biden’s pressure has led to an end of the blockade, as well as the release of several Saudi political prisoners, including human rights activists.

This easing of tensions will reopen diplomatic possibilities in the region, including using newly-opened Qatari airspace and US military bases, which can all be used as leverage when negotiating with Iran. Taking a more balanced approach to the Middle East serves to reduce the possibility of alienating typically US-aligned nations like Qatar, while also allowing US foreign policy to be at least influenced by humanitarianism. Yemen may be a graveyard of Saudi tanks, soldiers, and dreams of an Iranian puppet state, but perhaps some good can eventually rise from the ashes.

The Northeast of India

Rohan Rajesh

When people think of India in their mental maps, most will probably see a peninsula jutting out from the underside of Asia into the Indian Ocean. They may see the land bounded by the Himalayas to the north and the Indus to the west. Frequently missing in this cartography is a landlocked section of India, consisting of seven states, separated from the rest of India by a thin strip of land between Bangladesh, Nepal, and Bhutan and surrounded by those countries as well as Tibet and Myanmar. Colloquially and in policy circles, this region is known as the Northeast. The region is at once a part of India and distinctly separate from it. Although these seven states are grouped together, the people living there are frequently more different from each other than from the rest of India. Many parts of Northeast India have seen devastating separatist conflict with the Indian government, which wants to maintain control over the region but frequently neglects it because of its minimal electoral influence. India’s relationship with these states touches on many issues, including what it means to be an Indian.

If India is diverse, the Northeast is a microcosm of that diversity. Although the region is grouped collectively, the people of the eight states – Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, Sikkim, and Tripura – do not have a sense of nationhood. There will likely never be a country that consists of these states. For one thing, linguistically, they are incredibly diverse. Although Assamese (an Indo-Aryan language related to Bengali and Hindi-Urdu) has the most speakers in the region, innumerable Sino-Tibetan and Austroasiatic languages are also spoken in these states, while Hindi and Bengali are also influential. 

These states are religiously diverse as well. In the states of Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, and Nagaland, Christianity has been either the majority, plurality, or significant minority religion since British Christian missionaries began converting locals in the 19th and 20th centuries. For that reason, these states also have a fairly high level of English proficiency, which makes migrants from these states valuable in India’s burgeoning service sector. In Assam, although Hindus form a majority, Muslims form a third of the population. In Arunachal Pradesh and Sikkim, Tibetan Buddhists form a significant minority and a majority, respectively.

The existence of these states also creates a racial issue in India. Many of the people living here do not look “Indian.” They tend to look like people in East and Southeast Asia. This has created serious issues in major cities where these migrants go. Shopkeepers in Delhi beat a young man from Arunachal Pradesh to death in 2014, leading to a reckoning for India on the issue of race. A lot of these issues (as usual) stem from British rule, during which the British government divided Indians along racial lines. But racial issues with the Northeast are another headache that India has to deal with to maintain unity.

Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh are the most peaceful regions in the Northeast. Sikkim is an interesting state since it was once an independent country, albeit a protectorate of India. Its monarchy and sovereignty were eliminated when the state was merged with India in 1975 via a (somewhat controversial) referendum, which followed an Indian intervention due to political turmoil in the erstwhile kingdom. Arunachal Pradesh does not have any significant separatist issues but is the subject of a major territorial dispute between India and China, which claims most of the state as “South Tibet.” 

The other states have seen varying degrees of separatism. These states are covered under the controversial Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA), which essentially gives immunity from prosecution to Indian forces battling insurgents. In battling human-rights-violating insurgents, the Indian government has also committed egregious crimes there. In Assam, the government allegedly backed “death squads” to kill the families of insurgents to dissuade locals from joining separatist groups. In 1966, the Indian government (under the ostensibly inclusive rule of the Indian National Congress) launched airstrikes in Mizoram, the only time the Indian government has ever done so against its own citizens. To combat the same insurgency, the Indian government forced villagers into so-called Protective and Progressive Villages (PPV), a program reminiscent of the US military’s controversial Strategic Hamlet Program during the Vietnam War. Ironically, most of these strategies were taken from the colonial playbook, which the Indian Independence movement fought against.

Recently, however, the Northeast has seen a decline in deaths and conflict. Much of this has to do with the BJP’s recent push in the region. In every one of these states, the BJP and/or its allies are in control of the state government. In the 2019 national elections, the BJP decimated the opposition Indian National Congress. Why is a region with significant Muslim and Christian populations electing the BJP? A major reason is that the BJP-led government has invested significantly in this long-neglected region. 

As part of the government’s Act-East policy, the Modi administration has invested significantly in infrastructure in the region to connect India to Southeast Asia. Electorally, the BJP has strategically allied with local parties while also tackling issues important in the Northeast. One of these is immigration, specifically from Bangladesh. Many in the Northeast resent the Bengali migration, be they Hindu refugees or Muslims seeking economic opportunities. In the state of Tripura, Bengalis form the majority of the population while ethnic Tripuris are the minority. This apprehension about Bengali immigration is why the controversial National Register of Citizens in Assam was so popular – it disenfranchised many people, most of whom were Bengali. 

However, the BJP is experiencing difficulties too. While the NRC is popular, the same anti-Bengali politics also explain why the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) was so unpopular – it would give Hindu refugees from Bangladesh a chance to stay. At the same time, the BJP’s obsession with banning the sale of beef has irked many in the Northeast, where beef is commonly consumed. 

It remains to be seen how the BJP will maintain its delicate balancing act. The policies that make it popular in North India are unpopular in the Northeast, and at the end of the day, North India provides more electoral power than any other region in India. The BJP’s anti-Bengali policies in the Northeast are understandably controversial in the populous state of West Bengal, where the BJP is eagerly looking to make inroads in the upcoming legislative assembly elections. It may be that the BJP’s focus on the Northeast will be enough to prevent opposition parties from returning. But critical issues remain in the region, particularly with regards to the AFSPA. While the world’s attention is currently diverted to the farmer protests in Punjab (where AFSPA used to be under effect) and is usually focused on Kashmir (where AFSPA is under effect), rarely has any significant attention been brought to the Northeast.

Currently, the main insurgent group in the state of Nagaland is in peace talks with the government. However, the relationship is rocky, and a successful peace deal does not mean the insurgency will go away. If the two sides can pull of the deal, it could signal peace in the region and potentially more investment. 

But the issue of who is an Indian will always remain. One way to solve the issue is by getting students to study the cultures and histories of all Indians. National history curricula in India tend to focus on the history of Delhi and the surrounding areas, and the Northeast will rarely find mention. Expanding the curricula will help all Indians feel Indian while mitigating racial antagonism. Inclusivity is important, particularly for countries as diverse as India. That’s a lesson India needs to learn, not just for the Northeast but for every separatist headache that the Indian government can never seem to solve.

Scotland the Brave, Scotland the Independent?

Jennings Dixon

Everyone wants to go to Scotland these days but are the Scots happy to have them? Scottish First Minister, Nicola Sturgeon, is taking a vocal stand against other world leaders from entering. In early January, former U.S. president Trump contemplated jetting off to Scotland to play a few rounds of golf instead of going to the inauguration; Sturgeon dismissed any of those ideas. Just this week, UK prime minister Boris Johnson decided to take a trip up north from Downing Street, and Sturgeon was less than thrilled. Sturgeon called his visit non-essential, but Johnson and the rest of his Conservative Party think otherwise.

An independent Scotland has sounded more mythical than the unicorn, but recent years have given slight hope to the possibility. For years a distrust and distaste against Westminster has grown in Scotland. Scots were concerned that the government in London was not properly representing Scotland. This irritation reached its zenith in 2014 when Scotland held an independence referendum. Ultimately Scots voted 55-45% against the independence referendum. Major issues such as economic and trade policy as well as maintaining European Union (EU) membership played integral roles in the decision. 

Scotland’s driving force of staying in the UK was to cling to the myriad benefits of the EU. However that all changed in 2016 when former Prime Minister Theresa May announced that the UK planned to withdraw from the EU (#brexit). Scotland overwhelmingly voted against Brexit. The formal withdrawal was finalized only last year with Johnson at the helm. The Scottish government continues to worry that lacking EU membership will leave the country worse off.

Then 2020 hit. We all know what that means. Since March, Johnson has been notorious for being reactive rather than proactive in his COVID-19 response. The UK currently ranks fifth and fourth in the world by cases and deaths, respectively. Sturgeon has been a staunch critic of Johnson’s policies and has called for more action and support. Earlier this month she announced a new lockdown for Scotland, as a new strain of the virus is accounting for almost half of recent cases. Current polls show a majority of Scots disapprove of Johnson’s handling of the pandemic while also supporting the choice to leave the UK. This is a sizable shift from 2014.

In an attempt to save face, Johnson jetted up to Scotland this week, visiting a hospital in Glasgow to promote vaccine distribution. Sturgeon staunchly opposes his trip; it violates new lockdown orders and appears to be an attempt to reconcile with Scotland. He is worried about Scotland’s growing disdain for how he has handled the pandemic and old feelings of independence. Johnson dismissed rumors about a new referendum, promising that he is only concerned about getting the virus under control. That is just not the case.

In May, Scotland holds local elections for seats in the Scottish Parliament at Holyrood. Sturgeon’s party, Scottish National Party (SNP) is the leading proponent of an independent Scotland. According to recent polls, SNP is slated for a big win in May. If that prediction comes to fruition, then SNP may have a shot at winning a majority in Holyrood, which would mean prioritizing the passing of a new referendum. Sturgeon has said already that she is devising a roadmap for a new legal independence referendum regardless of Johnson and Westminster's consent.

For the past several years Scotland has been inching closer and closer to independence. With a mix of Brexit and the current COVID-19 crisis, Scots have been feeling less inclined to trust the UK government for making its own decisions. Sturgeon is a strong leader with a clear focus. She understands her people and what they want, and she has the capacity to make change. It’s possible that within the next year the world has a new country to add to its list, and we’ll all have to update our globes. But whatever happens, I think it’s safe to say that the United Kingdom isn’t as united as it once was.

“The Underwear Poisoner”: What’s going on in Russia?

Jay Ramesh

Imagine that you’re in second grade. Everyday, your teacher walks your class to the library after lunch, and she picks a new line-leader every week based on whoever answers the most questions in class. It’s the second week of class, and you’re selected as the line-leader. You have fun walking your class to the library, and all your best friends walk right behind you. Now imagine that it’s the third week of class, and you see that a kid you don’t like is answering a lot of questions in class, threatening your position as line leader. So, taking the most logical approach possible, you put raisins in his cookie at lunch so that he throws up and has to go home, cementing your position as line-leader. According to Russian politician and activist Alexei Navalny, that’s what it feels like to be Vladimir Putin, President of Russia.

Putin has been the undisputed leader of Russian politics for 21 years, even amending the constitution to allow him to theoretically remain president for another 15 years. Though he has historically enjoyed mass popular support, he has faced heavy criticism from political opposition leaders, most notably 44-year old Alexei Navalny, a political leader and anti-corruption activist. Navalny had run for Mayor of Moscow back in 2013, but ultimately lost to a Putin-appointed incumbent mayor. 

The next year, the Russian government accused Navalny of embezzlement, which was widely seen as a purely political move to prevent him from running in subsequent elections. Navalny tried to run for president in 2018 but was barred due to his previous embezzlement charges.

Navalny has released many documents and a documentary exposing corruption in Putin’s Russia, marking himself as an enemy of the current regime. On August 20, 2020, he fell into a coma while on a flight to Moscow and rushed to a Berlin hospital. Subsequent international tests revealed that he had been exposed to a deadly soviet-era nerve agent. 

Navalny spent several months recovering from the coma and called Putin “The Underwear Poisoner”, accusing Putin of attempting to poison and assassinate him. He later released evidence that Russian agents had placed the nerve agent in the lining of his underwear.

When he returned to Moscow on January 17, Navalny was immediately detained and will be held in custody until February 15. His return to Russia has sparked waves of protests across the nation, most of which have been brutally suppressed by police in full riot gear. At least 5,000 people across the nation have been arrested after police used batons, tasers, and tear gas to subdue peaceful crowds of protestors. 

Navalny released a Youtube documentary after his arrest where he attempts to expose Putin’s wealth and corruption within Russia. As of the time of this writing, the video has over 100,000,000 views. For the past 21 years, the future of Russia has always been tied to the future of Putin, but the mass demonstrations across the country may signal that the Underwear Poisoner’s grip over Russia is nearing its end.

From Portugal to Panaji: The History of the Portuguese Raj

Rohan Rajesh

Much of the contemporary discourse on European imperialism in India focuses on the British. Indeed, the British did form the largest empire in India compared to the other European powers. But the British were not the first to enter India and were not the last to leave. Both those distinctions go to the Portuguese. While the British Raj started in 1757 and ended in 1947 (190 years), the Portuguese Raj lasted from 1505 to 1961, a whopping 456 years. Although the Portuguese ruled over a much smaller territory than the British, the history of Portuguese India is no less fraught with the crimes of imperialism.

Portuguese India was founded six years after Vasco da Gama’s discovery of a sea route to India around Africa in 1505. The first major Portuguese (and European) settlement in India was the port city of Cochin (today Kochi) on the southwest Indian coast. Portuguese India largely consisted of ports scattered along India’s western and eastern coasts, which were mainly used for trade. At one point, these ports included Bombay (today Mumbai) until it was given to the British as a royal marriage dowry in 1661. 

The Portuguese’s first and largest territory in Asia was the province of Goa on India’s west coast. Today, Goa is famed for its beaches, siesta culture, baroque churches, and nightlife. But in the heyday of European imperialism, Goa was the nexus for Portugal’s activities in India and indeed the Indian Ocean. Initially, for administrative purposes, all of Portugal’s African and Indo-Pacific territories were administered by the Portuguese Indian government, including Mozambique, Macao, and Timor-Leste, until the 19th century.

Despite the beauty of the various regions of Portuguese India, not all was well. The Portuguese fought with neighboring Indian kingdoms (most notably the Marathas) and pirates. Epidemics and competition from Europeans – especially the Dutch, the French, and the English – led to the decline in Portugal’s dominance in the region. Perhaps the most violent and controversial period in Portuguese India was the Goa Inquisition. 

This inquisition was essentially a transplant of the ones occurring in the Iberian Peninsula around this time in terms of the barbarity of the exercise. While on the Iberian Peninsula, the inquisitions targeted Jews and Muslims, in India, they targeted anyone who was not Portuguese Catholic, including Hindus, Buddhists, Jews, and Muslims. It is alleged that the Portuguese destroyed a tooth relic of the Buddha. 

The inquisition also targeted local Christian communities. The presence of Syro-Malabar Christians in India is almost as old as Christianity itself, but they were not Catholic and were persecuted by the inquisitors. The same treatment was meted out to newly converted Catholics who continued to follow local customs like speaking their native Konkani language, playing local instead of Western instruments, or growing Tulsi plants outside their houses. They were accused of being “crypto-Hindus,” “crypto-Muslims,” or “crypto-Jews.” Even if locals converted fully to Catholicism and Portuguese customs, that was not enough to escape good old-fashioned racism. Natives were frequently referred to as “negros” and “cachorros” (“dogs”). Portuguese priests would refer to Indian priests as “black priests” and deny them promotion.

Perhaps none other than Voltaire summarized the barbarity and hypocrisy best: “Goa is sadly famous for its inquisition, equally contrary to humanity and commerce. The Portuguese monks made us believe that the people worshiped the devil, and it is they who have served him.” 

By 1947, when India gained independence from Britain, only the French and Portuguese had possessions in India. France quickly gave up its possessions to India. Portugal, however, refused, much to the chagrin of the Indian government and Indian nationalists in Portuguese India. The first blow to the Portuguese came in 1954, when Indian nationalists overthrew the local Portuguese administration and replaced it with a pro-India administration that would be officially incorporated into India in 1961. Portugal brought the issue to the International Court of Justice at The Hague, which ruled that the Portuguese had the right to the colonies, but that India had the right to block inter-colony access. 

Portugal continued to refuse to give up the rest of its possessions, which included Goa and Daman & Diu. Western powers (allied with the Portuguese) urged restraint from India, but, by then, India’s patience had worn thin. India invaded Portuguese India and easily repelled the Portuguese counterattack. India had ended Portugal’s more than 450-year presence in India in two days. Portugal appealed to the UN Security Council, but India was protected by a Soviet veto.

Although most Western powers recognized that Portugal should have given up its colonies, they were disappointed by the fact that India had used military force after advocating non-violence for so long. Indeed, President Kennedy told the Indian ambassador to the US, “People are saying, the preacher has been caught coming out of the brothel.” 

Many leaders in the Third World countered that India had been “extraordinarily patient” and had used violence only as a last resort. To be fair, India had already fought a war with Pakistan in 1947 and would fight one with China a year later in 1962. Besides, the issue of the annexation of Portuguese India quickly became a dead letter even in Portugal. In 1974, Portugal’s right-wing authoritarian government fell in the Carnation Revolution, and diplomatic relations between Portugal and India were restored under Portugal’s new democratic government, which signed a treaty with India, recognizing Indian sovereignty over former Portuguese territories.

Despite its long presence in India, only Goa has retained significant Portuguese influence. English remains the most influential European language in India, although quite a few words have been borrowed from Portuguese in many Indian languages. For example, the word for “keys” throughout India is cāvī or cābī, from the Portuguese chave. Likewise, the word for “cupboard” is variations of almārī from the Portuguese armário. The ubiquity of these words across often unrelated Indian languages is evidence of the once-pervasive influence of Portugal along India’s coastlines even at the height of Indian empires like the Vijayanagara, the Mughals, and the Marathas. While Portugal’s influence in India is not embedded in its national conscience like the British Raj, the Portuguese Raj is interesting as it was the origin of European imperialism in India and the last vestige of it to fall.

Why we all need to know about Iraq

Zoe Hatsios

If I asked you which political party Saddam Hussein rose to power through, I bet you could not tell me. So why were 72% of Americans supportive of the invasion in 2003?

Political elites have an incredible amount of issue framing influence, and this was exhibited most evidently by President George W. Bush’s coverage of the political tumult in Iraq; not only was he able to persuade the public, but he pressured intelligence into an inaccurate report that Saddam was fostering nuclear arms - enough speculation to provide reason to invade immediately.

So when it became clear that Saddam actually did not have a nuclear arsenal, why didn’t we back out?

These are the questions foreign policy theorists should continue to ask. This action violated international law yet was still supported by a majority of the American public 5 years later. When I began to study this issue, I realized that this partially boils down to simple grand strategy alignment. Offshore balancers may criticize the War on Terror from the get-go, but others suggest that it is the duty of the United States to be a global policeman and spread democracy worldwide.

I am skeptical of the latter theory for multiple reasons, but what became most clear to me is that general US leadership and average Americans know virtually nothing about different cultures, specifically those that fall under non-democratic regime types. When Saddam Hussein first took hold of the Iraqi Ba’ath government in mid-1979, the party had been flourishing for a decade and state-sponsored employment was at a high. Prior to the Ba’athist occupation, no government had been in stable power in the region since the fall of the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, by 2003, despite Saddam’s intense repression and human rights abuses, some citizens felt as though American invasion was an infringement on a safe haven that Iraq had not experienced for almost a century.

Saddam Hussein was not fostering a nuclear arsenal. His regime was (initially) relatively successful and the party is still in power, although weakened, in Syria. Unlike the complete lack of nationhood that was resembled by Afghanistan, the most significant issues in Iraq arose from the treatment of rebels, aside from US distaste for authoritarianism. Tangentially, war is not an effective tactic for long-term state-building. All to say, the Bush Administration made a huge mistake, which the US government is literally still paying for. American intervention actually encouraged the rise of major terrorist groups, such as Al-Qaeda and ISIS.

Yet, we still look at the Middle East and say, “let’s help - let’s democratize.” Public support for troops in the Middle East is actually growing. Despite the immense amount of defense dollars spent and the background rise of new hegemons (namely, China), US foreign policy remains focused on the oil-rich, terror-stricken region.

And maybe this could be beneficial - if a non-violent approach was taken.

Even I could learn so much more valuable information about the Middle East: this is by no means comprehensive. It is just a starting point for holding skepticism in our country’s foreign policy decisions.

International Trauma and a Brave New World

Joshua O’Brien

For eleven months now, the world has been living through what might very well be the most traumatic event since the Second World War. At the time of writing, 105.8 million people are known to have contracted the disease, and 2.3 million have died as a result. These numbers are understated and are going to increase until this all ends.

The pandemic has brought personal pain to many. Some have gotten it; some have lost loved ones to it. All of us have made sacrifices because of it. Having been living an altered life for so long, I and many others are feeling burned out and isolated. The trauma of this pandemic is one wrought on all of humanity.

So, I have to wonder, what comes next? How will we move on from this? First, we will need to distribute effective vaccines and create a world where SARS-CoV-2 is no longer responsible for an excess of severe illness and death. Eventually, social distancing and health guidelines will relax. But then what? How will the economy recover? Will it continue to leave the most vulnerable amongst the global population behind? How will politics change? As a historian, I naturally wonder about the lasting impacts of such catastrophic events. The Second World War changed the face of Europe, and its broken alliance defined world politics for fifty years. The end of the Cold War strangled the momentum and allure of global Marxism. The Great Recession fermented a rise in nationalist politics. What will the Pandemic do?

Naturally, I hope that the trauma will lend itself to collective healing. Perhaps we can, as the President of the United States hopes, “build back better.” Perhaps we can foster international cooperation on trade and health. Or, perhaps, blame and heartache will foster animosity and frustration between nations. As optimistic as I want to be, I am concerned that the latter option is more likely.

Regardless, the post-pandemic world will not be the pre-pandemic world. We won’t be able to return to the norms of those halcyon days. Like the trauma of the World Wars and economic crises of the past brought new politics, players, and cultures, the trauma of the Pandemic will surely do the same. I look with excitement and fear towards this Brave New World.

What Happened to Sikhs in 1984

Rioting, Ethnic Cleansing, or Genocide?

Rohan Rajesh

As the farmers’ protests persist in the Indian states of Punjab and Haryana, references have been made to the Punjab Insurgency, a period of severe violence in Punjab from 1981 to 1995. One of the most controversial events of the insurgency was the 1984 anti-Sikh riots. The latter term is the Indian government’s official term, but some activists and community leaders claim the event was a genocide. While the event was horrific and irreprehensible, regardless of which term is used, words matter. After nearly 40 years, the events still serve as an unsewn tear in India’s communal fabric.

Since the Partition of India, some Sikhs began advocating an independent state for their people known as Khalistan. A few became radicalized by the proposition, leading to an insurgency (with backing from Pakistan) on New Delhi’s doorstep. At the same time, local Sikh parties began demanding autonomy for Punjab from New Delhi as well as the recognition of Sikhism as a separate religion from Hinduism (the Indian Constitution includes Sikhism, Jainism, and Buddhism under Hinduism for legal purposes). Additionally, India had invested more in agriculture during the Green Revolution, and Punjabi agriculture benefitted handsomely. But New Delhi also wanted to reallocate river water between Punjab and its neighboring states, heightening anxieties in the rural areas. Economic inequality between urban and rural areas increased, leading to significant rural youth unemployment. All of these factors led to a violent movement for Khalistan gaining some traction, resulting in hundreds of deaths in the early 1980s. The situation worsened in 1984. 

That was the year Operation Blue Star was launched by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi (no relation to Mahatma Gandhi) of the Indian National Congress (INC) party. An important insurgent, Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale, took up residence in the Golden Temple (the Sikh equivalent of Mecca) to evade the authorities. Bhindranwale had gained significant popularity among rural youth and was linked to several murders and assassinations. The government went guns blazing and stormed the temple to capture Bhindranwale (who was killed in the fighting) and other militants. Many Sikhs were outraged by what they perceived as an assault on their faith. In retaliation, Indira Gandhi was assassinated by her Sikh bodyguards. 

Angry Hindus began killing Sikhs and looting Sikh-owned businesses across North India, particularly in Delhi. They were also instigated and aided by members of the INC. Around 11,000 Sikhs were killed across North India, including 3,000 in Delhi alone. A sting operation by Cobrapost, an Indian investigative news source, claims that the Indian government and local police either did not prevent or outright colluded with the rioters. After the killings, Indira Gandhi’s son and successor Rajiv Gandhi callously responded, “When a great tree falls, the earth shakes,” as if the killings of thousands of innocent Sikhs were justified over the actions of two.

Now, let us look at the 1948 Genocide Convention definition of genocide. First, there must be intent to partially or completely destroy a national, ethnic, racial, or religious minority by any of the following means:

1. Killing members of the group;

2. Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;

3. Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;

4. Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;

5. Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

In determining if killings are genocide, the intent is the most important part. Few genocidaires leave detailed plans for the destruction of groups like the Nazis or the Khmer Rouge. That’s why genocide is so difficult to prosecute and why many governments, including the US government, are reluctant to wield the term for the Rohingya massacres in Myanmar. Instead, the Trump administration used the term “ethnic cleansing,” which does not have legal significance. During the Rwandan Genocide, the Clinton administration only publicly stated that “acts of genocide may have occurred” because calling the event a genocide would have necessitated a more robust response than the administration was willing to deliver.

With the events of 1984, there is no explicit documented intent on the part of the perpetrators to wipe out Sikhs in Hindu-majority areas. Legally, the massacres were brutal, senselessly violent revenge (At the same time, it is worth mentioning that Khalistani militants deliberately targeted and killed hundreds of Hindus in Punjab through the course of the insurgency). Of course, we are only talking about the legal definition of genocide, and naturally, many people would have broader views on the definition of genocide. 

While the term “genocide” may be legally tricky, the Indian government should certainly stop referring to the massacres as “riots.” Whatever the events of 1984 were, they were not disorganized or sporadic, but they were one-sided. The term “riots” obscures the true horror of the event and has led to frustration for many survivors.

Multiple government investigations have yielded few results. While low-level INC members have been convicted, many of the key players, witnesses, and victims are dead, and no police officers have been convicted. At the same time, investigations in India are heavily influenced by politicians, leading to few convictions for members of the INC. Whether or not subsequent investigations lead to convictions, at the very least, more education needs to be implemented in school curricula, and something similar to the Holocaust Museum should be created not only for the 1984 massacres but also for the other communal killings that have occurred in India’s post-Partition history, regardless of the party responsible. Only by acknowledging the sins of the past can we be ready to progress together.

First 100 Days

Reflections on the Biden Administration and International Relations

Joshua O’Brien

I am aware that it is a faux pas to write about America for an IR blog associated with The Internationalist, but I am going to offer three excuses. First is the fact that I carry an American passport and civics education, so the topic is of personal expertise. Second is the fact of America’s standing in the world—perhaps the United States cannot claim the superpower status it had in the 1990s, but it is still one of the world’s Great Powers. Its foreign policy has an effect on its many allies and adversaries. And lastly, this is a thought exercise we only get to observe every four or eight years. I want to take advantage of it.

My first reaction to the new Administration’s foreign policy is to cite Warren G. Harding in praising a return to normalcy. The foreign policy team Joe Biden has assembled is filled with stars. The President’s own resume includes both Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations committee and the Vice Presidency. Secretary of State Blinken is a career foreign policy official with institutional knowledge, and UN Ambassador-designate Linda Thomas-Greenfield is an experienced diplomat. Foreign policy stars from the Obama Administration are also returning. Samantha Power will head USAID, and Jake Sullivan is Biden’s National Security Advisor. Susan Rice is also returning, but with a limited domestic focus. The Biden team on foreign policy seems poised to work congenitally and with expertise that was lacking for the previous four years.

But I think it is flawed to merely term the new White House as a “return to normalcy” because it is refocusing itself with experts. Early policies have been more substantive than routine. Earlier this week, the President halted arms sales to long-time ally Saudi Arabia, and his climate executive orders have required climate change to be considered by the National Security Council as a key concern in its decision-making. Thomas-Greenfield took a stern stance on China in her Senate hearings, and press reports have indicated an already icy relationship between Presidents Biden and Putin. The Administration will clearly take a tougher approach to China than the Obama White House, and it will be even more active on the threat of climate change. The early significance of these decisions in outlining a broader agenda should not be missed as mere normalcy, but as significant and meaningful changes to American foreign policy from the previous administrations of this century.

In short: Average Joe might be a little more than average, and although the new Administration might seem like routine establishment, its figures also seem eager to make meaningful, even idealistic change.

Canada’s Frosty Relations with India

Rohan Rajesh

As tensions between China and the West continue to rise, India has been viewed as a democratic Asian alternative to help contain Chinese expansionism. While India has had comfortable relations with most western powers, one exception remains – Canada. Relations between Canada and India have faced many frictions for the past forty years or so over one issue. Most recently, Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau made comments expressing concern over the farmers’ protests in India. The protests, the most significant challenge to Modi since the anti-CAA protests last year, have been concentrated in the Punjab state, the majority of whose population is Sikh. India was furious, and one word hung like a cloud in the minds of Indian policymakers, which has poisoned relations between India and Canada for decades: Khalistan.

Khalistan is a separatist ideology that calls for an independent state for the Sikhs of the Punjab region of northwest India. During the Partition of India, the Punjab region was divided between India and Pakistan, with Muslims fleeing west and Hindus and Sikhs fleeing east. For much of India’s post-independence history, the idea of Khalistan had always been a fringe ideology. Sikhs formed a substantial part of the Indian independence movement, military, and government, and the Punjab region has been India’s breadbasket since the Green Revolution. At the same time, in the overall Punjab region (which includes the states of Punjab, Haryana, and Himachal Pradesh), Hindus form the majority. In the Punjab state, in particular, Sikhs comprise the majority but with a substantial Hindu minority. So, the feasibility of a landlocked Sikh state with a significant Hindu minority has always been a question mark.

Still, the Khalistan movement gained significant momentum in the 1980s, mainly over concerns about the diversion of river water. Violence against Hindus, moderates, and government officials increased. In 1984, Sikh extremists fleeing Indian security forces hid in the Golden Temple. The Golden Temple is to Sikhism what Mecca is to Islam. So, when the Indian government stormed and fired bullets and artillery at the temple to flush out the extremists, there was a predictably negative reaction from the Sikh community. Although most Sikhs did not support the terrorists, many were furious with the government for using excessive force and damaging their holy site. Then-Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was assassinated by her two Sikh bodyguards over the issue. That led to a horrific anti-Sikh pogrom in North India (particularly in Delhi), mostly stoked by Gandhi’s Indian National Congress party, and the actors responsible were not prosecuted. 

From there, the insurgency in Punjab gained significant momentum, and the killings continued. It was widely suspected that Pakistan’s intelligence agency, the ISI, was supporting the insurgents, leading New Delhi to crack down harshly. The strategic importance for New Delhi of containing the insurgency is hard to understate. The region borders Pakistan and is close to the national capital, Sikhs form a significant part of the military, and the region is critical to India’s food security.

The situation continued to worsen through the eighties and the nineties. Eventually, the Indian government managed to force the movement underground, many Sikhs became disillusioned with the Khalistan movement, and since 1995 the insurgency in Punjab has mostly been a non-issue. That said, India still looks apprehensively at any perceived threats to its territorial integrity, which brings us to its tense relations with Canada.

The Sikh diaspora in Canada is extremely influential. Even though they only form 1% of Canada’s population, their effective organization, and a particular quirk in Canada’s electoral system magnify their importance. Unlike in the US, Canadian candidates for Parliament for each party are selected based on the number of signatures they get from party members and voters rather than by a general primary vote. This “pay-to-play” system rewards organized interests who can get more signatures. This explains why, despite their small numbers, there are more Sikhs in Canada’s House of Commons and cabinet than in the equivalents in India. It also explains why even a minority within a minority (like Canadian Sikh supporters of Khalistan) can gain so much influence.

In the 1980s, members of the Sikh diaspora in Canada and other western countries provided significant support to the Khalistan movement. In 1985, the deadliest act of aviation terrorism before 9/11 and the worst terrorist attack in Canadian history occurred when Canadian Sikh extremists placed a bomb on an Air India flight traveling from Montreal to Delhi. All 329 people on board, including 268 Canadian citizens, 27 British citizens, and 24 Indian citizens, were killed. Although the Khalistan movement may have died down in India, in the West, a minority within the Sikh minority has played a visible role in supporting Khalistan.

This dynamic has led to awkward situations in India-Canada relations. In 2018, Trudeau made an official trip to India. Unfortunately, Trudeau’s office sent an invitation to a Sikh extremist convicted of attempted murder. The extremist in question, Jaspreet Atwal, was found guilty of trying to murder an Indian minister in 1986 and was blamed for an assault on British Columbia’s then-premier Ujjal Dosanjh, a moderate Sikh who vociferously opposes Khalistan and violent extremism. The invitation was rescinded, but not before Atwal had taken pictures with Mr. Trudeau’s wife. The Indian government was understandably miffed, and that incident set the tone for the rest of the disastrous trip.

Many commentators have pointed to the incident as one of many where Khalistanis have been able to penetrate Canadian politics and Trudeau’s Liberal Party, in particular. In 2017, Trudeau attended a parade for Khalsa Day (the Sikh New Year). That parade included floats glorifying Khalistani militants. There are several other incidents you can find quite easily on the internet. The bottom line is that these issues are undermining Canada’s relationship with India at a time when Canada wants to diversify its portfolio on issues ranging from trade to defense. 

Obviously, the Canadian government cannot and should not try to stop peaceful demonstrations just to placate India. Doing so would undermine Canadian democracy no matter how disagreeable the speech is. However, there are obvious steps the Canadian government can take to avoid awkward situations with India. For one, it should recognize that there are bigger human rights issues elsewhere that involve Canada more directly than the farmers’ protests. Criticizing Indian police tactics while selling weapons to Saudi Arabia (whose actions in Yemen have created the world’s greatest humanitarian crisis) does not demonstrate Canada’s commitment to unequivocally standing up for human rights. Ideally, the pay-to-play system should be reformed in favor of a primary system where all voters get to decide on the candidates. 

At the same time, the Indian government should stop overreacting to the public musings of foreign politicians. Only insecure countries worry about what others think of their internal affairs. What the Prime Minister of Canada says about protests in India is not going to reignite the Khalistan movement. Increased Canadian sensitivity to Indian security concerns and decreased Indian reactivity to these statements will enable the two countries to focus on more important issues like trade, climate change, and upholding a rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific.

2020: A Year of Cartographic Warfare in South Asia

Rohan Rajesh

2020 was an eventful year in South Asia. The year kicked off with the anti-CAA protests and the Delhi riots in India. COVID-19 spread through the region, devastating India in particular. The China-India border witnessed the first killings in 40 years, bringing the already tense relationship to historic lows. California Senator Kamala Devi Harris became the first Indian American to be elected Vice-President. The Intra-Afghan talks continued with President Trump rushing to remove the remaining US troops before the end of his term. And, finally, farmers from the Indian states of Punjab and Haryana have been protesting in huge numbers against newly passed laws deregulating agriculture. 

It was a difficult year for everyone, and South Asia is no exception. Some relatively light-hearted moments, however, involved the seriousness with which South Asian countries staked their claims to disputed territories by issuing new maps. While cartographic warfare and propaganda are regular features of South Asian politics, they reached new and humorous heights in 2020.

First, let us take a look at Nepal. In 2019, after reorganizing the borders of the erstwhile state of Jammu and Kashmir, India issued a new map to reflect the change. As expected, Pakistan and China were not pleased with the map, which laid claim to territories controlled by them but long claimed by India. The lesser-known conflagration that developed was between India and Nepal. Nepal lays claim to a small strip of land on its northwest border with India, which includes the Kalapani territory, the Lipulekh pass, and the Limpiyadhura pass. The issue comes from ambiguities in an 1806 treaty signed by the Kingdom of Nepal and the British East India Company (border disputes created by British maps are a theme in this piece). India, however, has controlled the territory since its 1962 war with China. The issue subsided until 2020 when India inaugurated a road that connects India and China through the disputed territory. The road is meant to facilitate the travel of Hindu pilgrims to holy sites in Tibet, but many in Nepal were not pleased, and protests broke out immediately. So, in May, Nepal issued its own map, which for the first time included the disputed territory, angering India. Now, it seems that relations between the two are on the mend, but the seriousness with which these countries take map-making is strange, considering the minuscule nature of the claims and the fact that new maps do not change the de facto situation.

This brings us to the even more shocking map issued in 2020. Last August, Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan unveiled a new map of Pakistan that included Indian-administered Kashmir. What caught the attention of many in India was that the map also included the Indian regions of Junagadh and Manavadar, which are today in the western state of Gujarat (the home state of Prime Minister Modi). When India was partitioned in 1947 by the British, the princely states (semi-autonomous states that recognized British suzerainty) were technically free to choose between India, Pakistan, or independence. In practice, most princely states within India went to India, and most in Pakistan went to Pakistan. There were three exceptions: Jammu and Kashmir, Hyderabad, and Junagadh. The first involved a Hindu ruler of a majority-Muslim population, while the latter two involved Muslim rulers of majority-Hindu populations. Hyderabad was landlocked within India, so India annexed it in 1948. Junagadh was not connected to Pakistan, but it did border the Arabian Sea and so feasibly could have been part of Pakistan just like East Pakistan (Bangladesh today). The Nawab actually acceded to Pakistan, but the Hindu-majority population protested the move.

Complicating the situation was that Junagadh’s three vassal states were split on the decision. The ruler of Manavadar agreed with accession to Pakistan (which is why it was included in Pakistan’s map), while the other two vassals defied the Nawab and chose to accede to India. The Nawab responded with military force, forcing India to intervene. A referendum was held in 1948 in the states, and the people chose to accede to India. Pakistan never accepted the results, but the dispute was forgotten (though it was a major crisis between 1947 and 1948). 

That is, until 2020 . . . maybe. It’s unlikely Pakistan seriously claims Junagadh and Manavadar. The fact that Pakistan never included Junagadh in its maps after 1948 means that Pakistan’s claims are rather pointless. Additionally, the idea of Pakistan was to create a homeland for South Asian Muslims, but Junagadh was Hindu-majority. So, the unveiling of the map was simply a move to irritate India, which it succeeded in doing. 

While these instances have been humorous and insignificant, maps have had real and serious consequences in South Asia since 1947. The British (as usual) were rather terrible at map-making, leading to the current tensions between India, China, Pakistan, Nepal, and Bhutan. 

A lesser-known (but no less deadly) theater of the Kashmir dispute also resulted from cartographic ambiguities. In 1972, the Simla Agreement was signed by India and Pakistan to provide a new framework for dialogue after the two had fought a third war in 1971. The agreement settled the de facto border between the two countries in the disputed Kashmir region, except for one small region: the Siachen glacier. It is a truly desolate high-altitude area, and the makers of the agreement never considered that anyone would seriously covet it. But covet it they did. 

In 1980, the US Defense Mapping Agency included the glacier within the borders of Pakistan. India was not pleased, and the two countries ended up fighting over the glacier, first by sending mountaineering expeditions and then with soldiers and weapons. India ended up with control of the glacier, but both countries continue to suffer heavy casualties largely due to the bitingly cold Himalayan temperatures. The conflict (dubbed the highest battlefield in the world) also gave rise to a new term: oropolitics (“politics of mountains” in Greek). So, have a laugh over the cartographic developments of 2020, bearing in mind the serious consequences the humble map can have.

The North

Joshua O’Brien

We all know that the Earth is warming unsustainably, and the polar bears are dying. Yes, it’s morbid, but it’s true. Despite this, the Arctic is not understood in popular imaginations as an area of interest for foreign policy. Afterall, there is not much up there; you need an icebreaker to navigate it, and for half of the year it promises the world’s worst case of seasonal depression to any mariner who dares to visit. But as climate change slowly advances, this will change.

In fact, it has already started to change. In the last five years, foreign ministries have commented more frequently on the Arctic, with Secretary of State Mike Pompeo noting the region will “present new opportunities” (Hansler, 2019). China has proclaimed itself a “near-Arctic state” in strategy, and has designs for a “Polar Silk Road,” which would cut the cost of shipping to Europe by a third. Russia, a country with the widest stretch of Arctic coastline, has re-emphasized its Northern Fleet in recent strategies.

This narrative makes the Arctic seem like it is already devolving into chaos. It is not. For the past couple of years, the Arctic Council has been able to maintain the region’s peace and stability. There are no immediate border disputes in the region, though international litigation on several sea borders and Exclusive Economic Zones is ongoing. Further, shipping across the Northeast Passage and Northwest Passage have only occurred a couple times, typically with icebreakers, as these passes are not consistently ice-free at this time. It is expected that by 2050, more routine shipping through the region will be possible. Additionally, many countries do not have the infrastructure or resources in place to address the Arctic. The United States, in particular, lacks a strong icebreaker fleet and has limited search and rescue capability north of the Bering Strait. Regardless, the region will become more accessible, and what is now a small issue will become a bigger one.

This geography, and its dramatic shifts, is why the United States, Canada, and other Arctic countries should begin thinking about their resources and policy in the region more in-depth. Of course, I do not make policy for either government, but in particular Arctic states should come to long-term limits on shipping through the region to respect the environment, prevent disasters such as oil spills, and prevent further exacerbations of the climate crisis. It may not be a major issue now, but in the decades to come, I trust that the dark, sleepy Arctic will get more international attention.

Hansler, Jennifer. “Pompeo: Melting sea ice presents 'new opportunities for trade'” CNN, May 7, 2019. cnn.com/2019/05/06/politics/pompeo-sea-ice-arctic-council/index.html.

A Future Without Chocolate

By Anyi Li

Can you imagine a world without chocolate? I know, it sounds awful. However, recent evidence has all pointed to a probable future world without chocolate. 

The primary ingredient within chocolate is cacao--a plant that has an enduring history that we can trace all the way back to the pre-colonial Aztec and Inca Empires. At the time, cacao was a cultural, ceremonial drink that the Native Americans viewed as sacred. It was not meant to mix with sugar, milk, nuts, and fruits. After the European colonization of the Americas, they added sugar into cacao drinks to neutralize the slightly bitter, spicy taste of cacao. It was a drink to which only the very rich had access. It was not until the industrial revolution that people made cacao drinks into widely affordable and popular chocolate bars. Later on, Europeans transformed many African, American, and Asian colonies near the Equator into nationwide plantations with cacao as the cash crop with the expanding western colonialism and imperialism. Even after the post-colonialism today, these regions continue to grow cacao.

Cacao can only grow within 10-15 degrees north and south of the Equator. Yet in recent years, El Nino, an atmospheric phenomenon caused by global warming, has brought extreme rainfall and drought to many regions of the world, hitting the regions near the Equator particularly hard. Many cacao production centers were impacted, including West Africa, Indonesia, and Ecuador. While the demand for chocolate (which also means demand for cacao) grows annually, a 2014 estimate predicts a 250,000 tonnes shortage for cacao worldwide, and 40,000 metric tonnes loss of cacao will occur in Ecuador alone in 2015. Moreover, an Amazonian fungus, otherwise known as the witches-broom disease, has swept Brazil. This fungus destroyed most Brazil’s cacao plantations and infected many former cacao farmers with a skin disorder. Due to this disease, Brazil fell from the second-largest exporter of cacao to only sustainable to its internal national market while still suffering from climate change.

If the witches-broom disease continues to sweep the world, and if the climate continues to change unchecked for the worse, then in the near future, we will very likely face the gloomy reality that we have no chocolate to eat, or at least no chocolate that we can easily afford to eat.

The Plight of Racing to the Bottom

By Anyi Li

Racing to the bottom, which describes a socio-economic phenomenon that governments turn a blind eye to business activities to attract foreign companies, is common to the developing nations, especially in Asia and Africa. Accompanying this intentional negligence is that companies and factories take advantage of these developing nations’ workers in the forms of unfair pay, horrible working conditions, excessively long working hours each day, and even child labor to lower their business costs. People living in the developed and wealthy Global North, shocked by news uncovering the horrendous treatment received by these workers, always assume that governments in developing countries simply do not care about their citizens. Some parts of this assumption may hold true, but it is not the full picture of the story.

Western companies’ underlying reason to manufacture in developing countries is the cheap labor cost. When a certain developing country’s labor cost increases due to increasing living costs and improving living standards, many corporations from the Global North shift their manufacturing centers to countries with even cheaper labor. For instance, in the post-WWII years, Nike manufactured mainly in Japan, but it moved its manufacturing centers to South Korea and Taiwan as labor cost in Japan rose in the 1970s. And in the 1980s, when labor cost again rose in South Korea and Taiwan, Nike shifted to China. Recently, with the Chinese economy and society advancing into higher levels of development, we begin to see the Chinese factory workers’ rising wages drive western companies such as Nike and Apple away to Southeastern Asia. This shift often leaves little time for developing countries to adjust their economies and creates massive unemployment in developing countries. As a result, governments turn a blind eye to their export industries disobeying minimum wage laws and working condition requirements. 

At this point, you may ask: why do developing countries’ governments want to attract western companies in the first place? The simple answer is that these countries have to catch up to the wealthy Global North in development. However, plagued by decades, or even centuries of colonialism, wars, and poverty, they cannot miraculously transform their mostly agrarian society to a fully industrialized, developed one in a few decades when such it has taken the western countries more than a century. And in the current globalized economic environment, it is even harder for them to industrialize, modernize, and lift their people from poverty without opening doors to western companies. To remain competitive against other developing nations, governments in developing countries have little choice but to concede to racing to the bottom.