Opportunity and Ethics: The Indian-Israeli Labor Agreement

“We know there’s a war going on in Israel. I am not afraid of death. We can die here too.” says Ram Avatar, a 40-year-old tile setter from Haryana.  

In April of last year, United Nations estimates revealed that India had outpaced China in global population rankings. With its population approaching 1.5 billion, India is estimated to birth an average of 86,000 babies per day, in comparison to just under 50,000 in China. As a result, nearly 53% of the population in India is under 30 years old. Despite the presence of a sizable population of young and educated individuals in India, the lack of employment opportunities has led to tens of millions of young workers becoming a strain on the economy. 

The State of Working India Report from 2023 indicated a decrease in the pace of regular wage jobs since 2019 due to slowdowns in growth, and the global pandemic. Over 15% of graduates remained unemployed post-pandemic, with that number increasing to 42% for graduates under 25 years old. As per official reports, Israel intends to recruit 70,000 workers from China, India, and other nations to support its construction sector, which has faced extreme challenges since the attack on October 7th. Critics have expressed concerns that this agreement between India and Israel puts workers at risk by sending them into a politically charged conflict zone. Critics also cite the displacement of thousands of Palestinian workers who previously held these positions as another major cause for concern. Since October 7th, Israel has canceled work permits for tens of thousands of Palestinian laborers, deporting them back to the Gaza Strip. 

For some, the prospect of immigrating to Israel for work is an obvious choice, even in the face of ongoing conflict. 31-year-old Ranjeet Kumar has struggled to find secure employment in India for years–despite earning two degrees. Ranjeet’s story is not unlike that of many in India.  Many laborers hold advanced degrees but struggle to find employment in an oversaturated market. Eventually, these citizens end up in “casual” construction jobs, averaging anywhere from $10,000 - $15,000 rupees per month (~$120-180 USD). However, employers in Israel are offering monthly salaries of around $137,000 rupees (~$1600 USD), including medical benefits. Rajneet hopes to support his family of seven by securing one of the 10,000-40,000 positions Israel anticipates recruiting from India. 

While the Indian-Israeli labor agreement may present a lifeline for struggling Indian workers, the arrangement raises unsettling questions about worker exploitation and the effects on broader geopolitical dynamics. This labor arrangement, born from Israel’s internal conflict and labor shortages, risks exploiting vulnerable Indian laborers desperate for economic opportunity. Sending this demographic into an extremely volatile zone raises questions about both worker safety and informed consent. In conjunction with this, critics have also pointed to historically discriminatory policies that have undermined Palestinian rights in Israel. To ignore these underlying tensions, especially amidst an ongoing conflict, could potentially perpetuate cycles of inequality and injustice. Critically examining these policies, from worker safety to their impact on Palestinians in the region, is crucial to ensuring that solutions are equitable and sustainable for all nations involved.

Globalization and World Poverty

The eradication of poverty and the uplifting of global peoples from positions of destitution has been among the world’s greatest aims of the last 100 years. It has also been its most fragile. From the perspectives of morality, economy, and politics, it never has seemed like there exists a “perfect” route by which to relieve global poverty rates, and disputes abound surrounding the proper implementation of global economic and humanitarian aid, especially in the face of globalization, which has saved many, but disgruntled some others. The consideration of the effects of widespread colonialism by Western countries have been brought increasingly into the spotlight of contemporary debates on economic and political justice across the world.

Globalization does indeed have the potential to work, but when thinking about the world it is easy to forget the many internal factors at play in Less Developed Countries (LDCs) that may keep the people living within their borders in poverty and without much opportunity for relief. I argue in this essay that, while the legacy of colonialism was devastating and its effects are very visible today, it is ultimately the implementation of inclusive, democratic political institutions that guarantee the highest level of success in terms of development and the eradication of poverty. I argue also that because of the necessity of stable political and social environments, the international push for a reduction in poverty by means of foreign aid is not as effective in the long-term as encouraging less corruption and more democratic policies. 

It is an interesting thing to observe that one of the main justifications of historical colonialism was the development of poorer, “less civilized” nations and peoples. This is because, as Jeffry Frieden and others write in World Politics, “Colonial rule was commonly negligent at best, predatory at worst.” The relationship between ruler and colonist was often characterized by forced labor, with harsh punishments accompanying gaps or lapses in productivity, a suppression of local customs and beliefs in favor of the “more civilized” European customary and belief systems, all the way down to genocide and many other egregious violations of human rights. But the question among scholars remains; if most, if not all, colonial societies were oppressive, then why did some countries fare better economically and politically in the post-colonial world than others?

An oft-cited explanation for the diversity of outcomes from colonial rule comes from Daron Acemoglu, James Robinson, and Simon Johnson in their paper “The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation.” In it, they argue that colonial governments did better or worse based on the viability of colonial settlement and economic development within the colonies, and that these systems of viability could be divided into two types. In the first, the region is more viable, meaning the colonial environment was less hazardous to settlers, meaning a safer, more survivable disease environment with access to potable water and room for settlement. In these environments, Europeans could survive to form corporations and build infrastructure around the resource environment that led to the establishment of European governmental norms and the flow of investment that, upon independence from the colonial rulers, were advantageous towards building up an independent government and society. In the other environment, geographic conditions made it impossible for large numbers of settlers to survive, necessitating more predatory policies to be put in place, forcing resources to be extracted more efficiently.

Significantly, the same institutions that were established in colonially viable areas were not implemented in more dangerous and exploitative places, and those institutions were not conducive to economic growth, giving way to less room for successful political and economic development in the future, according to World Politics. Arguments exist as to the exact importance of geography in determining the outcome of a state, such as the example discussed in class between Zambia and Botswana, but the overarching legacy of colonialism remains the same. 

As time went on, and colonial territories were slowly let go of and granted their independence, the great powers of the world turned towards international trade as the surest and most beneficial route of economic development in the world, abandoning the principles of mercantilism that first drove the grab for colonial possessions. In the modern age, writes Frieden and colleagues, most economists and economic analysts agree that international trade is a positive good, and that trade restriction is a negative thing for a state’s economy. But the benefits of trade are not equal everywhere. Richer countries, like the United States, China, and Russia, can use their overwhelming power to exert much more influence on the developing world than LDCs can ever hope to. As a result, their products, consisting mostly of primary products like agricultural goods, are subject to wide fluctuations in pricing, whether by changes in demand or subsidization by said richer countries. In larger, multinational organizations like the WTO, the World Bank, or the IMF, the interests of rich countries drown out those of LDCs, who are often forced into policies of debt repayment or austerity that benefit rich countries, and don’t address the internal problems that may have caused the debt in the first place. 

In the face of some of the biases of international institutions, many developing countries have turned inwards towards two major types of industrialization. The first is Import-Substituting Industrialization, aka ISI. Countries following this model tend to have been historical makers of primary products who, in search of rapid economic development, adopted ISI to rapidly turn the population of a state towards a manufacturing society, with exports in goods like cars, medical equipment, and technology. Within decades, countries like “India, Brazil, Mexico and Argentina were nearly self-sufficient in manufactured products.” However, these policies were much more vulnerable to financial crises than the other model of industrialization—Export-Oriented Industrialization, or EOI. Through this model, especially used by East Asian countries, primary products like toys, clothing, etc. were targeted aggressively at large markets, like that of the United States. Both models were used to great degrees of success and have allowed developing countries to pull themselves out of poverty and allow them to change into secondary producers. 

Significantly, both models of development have issues that, when combined with other internal problems like a lack of infrastructure and corrupt governmental officials and policies, can greatly hinder the growth of developing nations. I argue that, in the face of these issues, it is vastly more important for a government and members of international institutions to reform its political system and establish infrastructure before a turn can be made toward the development of industrial and manufacturing policies. These failures come in many different ways, all or one of which can play a part in keeping a country undeveloped. One explanation for the corruption seen in LDCs is a phenomenon called the resource curse, whereby a state, abundant in natural resources, fails to see a need to diversify their economy, tax their citizens (thereby reducing government accountability), and the funds from natural resources being embezzled into the pockets of the ruling class. The legacy of the colonial systems, which, I argue, are not as influential in keeping poor countries poor, must also be considered, with hollowed out political institutions providing an easy method by which countries can become corrupt.

Despite this, Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson, the same authors of the development study examined in class and in the textbook, wrote a vastly influential book entitled “Why Nations Fail,” which, in its first chapter, examines the vast differences in outcome that are to be witnessed in identical geographical areas, but under different governmental structures. The authors examine the neighboring towns of Nogales, Arizona, in the United States, and Nogales, Sonora, in Mexico. Like the example of Zambia and Botswana, “Los dos Nogales” mirror each other geographically very closely—so closely, in fact, that the only thing separating them is the border between the two countries. Despite this, Nogales, Arizona is much better off than its Mexican counterpart. The difference? The residents of Nogales, Arizona have access to American political and economic institutions, which grant them access to education, free choice of occupation, and access to the democratic process. The power of these differences is so significant, write the authors, that the residents of the two countries “live in a different world shaped by different institutions.” It is clear through this example that the most important thing for developing countries to have to ensure the success and security for their constituents are open, free, and fair political institutions and equitable economic institutions. 

It is for this reason that the global focus should not be so much on trade or aid but on the fight against corruption. The extent of this problem, in combination with the relative inefficacy of aid and humanitarian programs, is best observed in African nations. The problem of corruption is so pervasive in these states that it has become to academics “a standard mode of transacting political and financial business.” What’s more, the issue of corruption is also very hard to define, and when government officials commit crimes, the line between, say, fraud, and full-blown corruption is very blurry. In these cases, aid and investment money is liable to be embezzled into the pockets of powerful political figures, such as when in 1978 “mining firm Gecamines deposited its earning directly into [Mobutu Sese Seko’s] presidential account.” In this case and others like it, the money was redirected from the public good to the pockets of the leaders of corrupt countries, leading to a vicious cycle: aid and investment money would be given to a country, which would be embezzled by powerful people within the country and would not be given to causes such as infrastructure development, which would close off access to economic opportunities, which would keep the people of the country poor. It is possible even that globalization has been a factor that has contributed to the continued existence of corruption in Africa. What, then, is the use of aid money, trade money, or investment funds? I mentioned earlier the bias of international financial institutions like the IMF and the World Bank, which, if and when loans to LDCs go bad, encourage unfair policies of austerity that sometimes outright punish the people in said LDCs. Even if these loans are provided, the money is at risk of being embezzled as seen in 2018, when 18 people were indicted in connection to a $2 billion dollar loan scheme that embezzled investment funds from major international banks. These policies only exacerbate the issue of global poverty. For if the people of a country do not see the benefits of money flowing in from trade or aid, and it instead goes into the pockets of the rich and powerful, then those people are robbed of the benefits of development, and it is only a reform of the political and economic institutions established inside a state that can improve the standards of living of the people living within it.

Year-end state of German politics

As 2023 enters its last month, a reflection on the current state of German politics is warranted. The nation, Europe’s largest democracy and economy, has this year seen increasingly divisive politics: widespread dissatisfaction with the ruling “traffic light” coalition, a monthslong debate over the Building Heating Regulation, and intra-party divisions have made Germany’s contentious developments a top focus for Europe watchers in 2023. With the far-right populist AfD on the rise, though facing a leftist copycat movement, and the Green Party struggling, taking stock of the situation will be helpful for understanding the direction German politics are likely to take in early 2024.

As of early December, national parliament voting intention polls place the far-right Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) party as retaining 21% support among the German electorate. Increasing from 14% support one year ago, the AfD is now out-polling Germany’s Social Democratic Party (SPD), which leads the current federal governing coalition and remains one of the nation’s main parties. Such a level of AfD support has not been seen since the party’s founding in 2013 and represents an alarming trend, indicating that popular dissatisfaction with Germany’s current governing coalition has translated into support for populist alternatives. The party’s right-wing tilt has attracted the attention of Germany’s domestic intelligence agency, the BfV, which was allowed in a March 2022 ruling to begin surveillance of the group as a “suspicious entity”. Permitting the surveillance of the party as a whole followed the BfV’s classification of its youth wing, the Young Alternative (JA), as a “certified right-wing extremist endeavor”. 

The ongoing trial of Björn Höcke, the AfD’s leader in the eastern federal state of Thuringia, over his May 2021 use of a banned Nazi slogan during a speech has evidently not harmed the party’s perception by the public. As the challenges facing the current government only grow and migration remains a central issue, the AfD’s support can be expected to remain at similar levels or even increase in the first few months of 2024. However, recent events suggest that an unexpected far-left challenge could endanger portions of the party’s support.

Disagreements over policy goals and leadership have led to a recent split within Die Linke (the Left party). Historically popular in the eastern federal states, Die Linke is a successor of the SED, which governed East Germany during the period of German division, and campaigns from social justice, anti-NATO, and socialist positions. In October, divisions between the party’s moderate members and a faction led by former parliamentary leader Sahra Wagenknecht escalated into a complete split, with Wagenknecht leaving Die Linke and taking 10 of the party’s 38 parliamentary members with her. Since the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, Wagenknecht has opposed exporting arms to Ukraine to aid in its self-defense and has spoken against sanctioning Russia, prompting some observers to label her as “pro-Putin.” 

With her condemnation of the current government mirroring that of the AfD, Bjorn Höcke invited Wagenknecht to join the populists following her departure from the Left; some analysts argue that this demonstrates the AfD fears losing votes to the renegade’s new movement, which is expected to attempt to form an official party in early 2024. As Der Spiegel’s Mathieu von Rohr writes, there could indeed “be a gap in the market for [Wagenknecht’s] mix of anti-Americanism, Putin apologism, socialism, migration scepticism as well as her openness to conspiracy theories.” Wagenknecht’s strong anti-immigration rhetoric stands at the center of what may be a novel platform combining conservative-populist social positions and leftist economics. Thus, in addition to endangering her former party’s continued representation in the Bundestag (Germany’s Grundgesetz requires parties to win 5% support in elections to be represented), Wagenknecht’s move has created a left-wing populist movement capable of drawing dissatisfied German voters away from the AfD. 

Germany’s environmentalist Green Party, a coalition partner in the current government, discussed its position and future at its recent party conference. Over the course of the four day conference in Karlsruhe, debates over the party’s recent involvement in asylum-restricting measures advocated by the federal government highlighted generational splits within the Greens. The Green Party’s younger members, it seems, oppose their representatives’ recent endorsement of tougher asylum measures and argue that such a shift abandons the party’s long standing asylum policy. The party has lost support since joining the ruling coalition in 2021, as it seems to have pushed too hard to take advantage of the opportunity that position presents to push its agenda. Climate protection measures, most notably the Gebäudeenergiegesetz (Building Heating Regulation), have grown increasingly unpopular in a nation struggling with high energy, heating, and housing costs, and the party has been publicly criticized by its own coalition partners. With public support for the Greens falling to its lowest in five years, the Green Party’s membership in the current division-plagued government has arguably proved more of a liability than an asset. 

This state of affairs makes the likely direction of German politics somewhat difficult to predict. Novel elements like Wagenknecht’s left-wing fraction movement defy typical political trends and will likely interact with segments of the AfD’s support, potentially siphoning off voters from the resurgent right. Though the impact Wagenknecht’s movement will have on the German political space has yet to be seen, all indicators point towards continued support for left- and right-wing populist alternatives to Germany’s mainstream parties. 

The SPD and Green parties’ falling approval show no signs of a turnaround, and the current government must now contend with a massive question over the budget. A recent court ruling struck down its plans to spend 60 billion euros in unspent coronavirus relief funds on a green transition, potentially endangering the practice of establishing “special funds” to pursue government priorities. Strict “debt brake” legislation limiting the rate at which the federal government can take on debt constrains the government’s choices; calls to abolish or amend the debt brake abound, and the issue can be expected to remain a major focus of German politics over the next few months.

The Coming of the Second Cold War

On November 9, 1989, an era of global politics and international relations came to an end with the fall of the Berlin Wall. The tumbling-down of the barrier that had for almost 40 years divided East and West Germany represented the cessation of the decades of ideological and geopolitical conflict that had taken place between the United States and the Soviet Union after World War II. This resolution was understandably massive, to the extent that some Liberal political theorists even went so far as to call the end of the Cold War “the end of history,” due to the final triumph of the ideas of liberal democracy over the concepts of communist dictatorship and fascist totalitarianism. 

Since then, the world has borne the fruits of an unprecedented amount of economic and geopolitical collaboration, with the United States at the center of the new unipolar world order. The global economy has nearly tripled, and almost 1.5 billion people have been lifted from poverty. The reduction of trade barriers and protectionism has allowed for a great amount of global economic integration that, while still controversial in the United States and abroad, is capable of bringing numerous states in need of infrastructure and economic development the necessary capital and investment to bring their peoples out of poverty. 

Another major factor in the increased international stability of the last few decades has been the role of multinational organizations like the United Nations. During the ideological battles of the Cold War, the U.S. and the Soviet Union would use the veto—the power to block legislation held exclusively by members of the P5 coalition of the UN Security Council—to the point of abuse, forcing stalemates in conflict resolution that hindered the United Nations from serving its role effectively. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, optimism that the United Nations could finally serve its purpose dramatically increased, and not without reason; in the four decades that have passed since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United Nations Security Council has been responsible for a good number of resolved conflicts, among them Namibia (1989-1990), Cambodia (1992-1993), and Côte d’Ivoire (2004-2017). It is not a question that the United Nations is here to stay, and further conflict resolution is hoped for and expected.

Yet in recent years, the United Nations has been experiencing a crisis of confidence. Concerns and skepticism are rising in regards to the decades-old institution, with a feeling growing among member states that the UN is becoming “rudderless” as a result of the difficulties it has faced in the era of increasing great-power competition. “Over the last year,” writes Richard Gowan for Foreign Affairs, the United Nations has been “unable to respond to crises ranging from violent flare-ups in Sudan and Nagorno-Karabakh to the coup in Niger.” Debates over the continued conflict in Ukraine have been “fruitless”, and important attention is being revoked from areas like the Middle East and especially Africa, an issue I wrote about last month.

This issue is especially pressing as common ground between the great powers of the world is increasingly shrinking. One of the greatest conflicts the United States faces today, for example, is with China. The United States and China are increasingly unable to find any ground upon which to agree, be it over Taiwanese sovereignty, economic sanctions, or military buildup and posturing in the South China Sea and elsewhere. A recent diplomatic shutdown occurred when Antony Blinken’s visit to Beijing following a fruitful sidelines discussion at the G-20 was cancelled after a Chinese spy balloon was detected floating over the United States. Lili Pike writes that in the months after the spy balloon controversy, “The countries’ presidents have traded harsh language; Xi [Jinping] said the U.S. aimed to contain and suppress China, while [Joe] Biden called Xi a ‘dictator.’”

World’s Largest Iceberg is on the Move

What Does This Mean for Global Warming?

The global warming crisis has danced across headlines for weeks, months, and even years. Although international efforts have brought about some improvement and change, one key fact remains the same: the icebergs are still melting. Sources like Britannica share how melting icebergs affect water chemistry, level, and the overall Arctic structure. However, more recent articles, particularly one from CNN, claim that there is a more pressing matter regarding icebergs: the largest iceberg is moving, and it is moving fast.

The world’s biggest iceberg, named A23a, is two times the size of London. Originally, when the block first broke away from its ice shelf in 1986, it simply held on to the sea floor. However, as it has started to shrink, the iceberg has started to move too. The iceberg is moving roughly three miles a day eastward. The Associated Press shared further knowledge on how ocean currents are moving A23a– and encouraging it to pick up speed. 

Scientists will continue to monitor the movement of A23a and its course. Although the iceberg is simply expected to shrink and eventually collide with the northern Arctic peninsula, this event may mark the first of many. As temperatures continue to rise, chunks of ice will continue to break off or lose grip to the seafloor, causing them to shift aimlessly in the arctic circle. An article by AquaTech explained how some countries suggested the idea of harnessing these moving blocks of freshwater and distributing them to water–constrained areas. However, this idea has brought up multiple issues– more than just the mere fact that the icebergs would melt while being transported. Iceberg movement disrupts ocean chemistry and topography, as well as animal habitat. As we move forward with visionary ideas for solving the climate crisis, we must continue to be aware of the melting Arctic ice and monitor its condition.

Hungary asks EU to take action against Bulgaria's transit tax on Russian gas

Recently, there has been strife in the European Union regarding the sanctions and taxes against Russian products and gas. Hungary still heavily relies on Russian natural gas, which poses a problem as Bulgaria has imposed a tax on Russian natural gas that passes through their country going into Bulgaria. This has created a strenuous situation for the EU as they will have to decide whether Bulgaria is legally allowed to impose a transportation tax on an item that is intended for another country. I find this ordeal a bit difficult to decide on as Bulgaria technically does have the right to tax this item as they allow it to be transported through their country. On the other hand, the goods being sold to Hungary are not related to Bulgaria other than the transportation aspect. I am curious how the EU will rule on this issue, but my assumption is that Bulgaria will be allowed to uphold this tax as the majority of the EU is sanctioning and taxing Russian goods, as well as trying to abstain from buying Russian products in general. 

Bulgaria believes that they have the right to do this as it “will reduce the privileged position of Russia’s state-owned energy company Gazprom in southeastern Europe and deter Russian influence in the region”. Not only is Hungary dissatisfied, but Serbia is as well as both countries rely on Russian gas. The European Commission will decide whether this is permissible or not. The tax is a bit hefty as it is “10 euros per MWh of Russian gas last month”. Hungary’s overall concern is that “gravely endangers the energy security of Hungary and the entire region”. Unfortunately, both Serbia and Hungary are very pro-Russian and will likely continue their use of Russian gas. Personally, I hope that this tax is upheld because the war that Russia has waged on Ukraine is unjust and purchasing Russian gas only fuels their war.

WHO's Disgraceful Compensation for Congo Sexual Abuse Victims Highlights Urgent Need for Reform

13-year-old “Jolianne” of the Democratic Republic of Congo recalls being on the side of the road, selling phone cards, when she was approached by a driver for the World Health Organization offering her a ride home. Instead of being driven home, she was raped and impregnated at a local hotel. 

In May of 2021, A World Health Organization-authorized panel revealed a shocking number of sexual abuse allegations between 2018 and 2020 during the Ebola response in the Democratic Republic of Congo. In total, this report implicated 83 individuals in the misconduct. Over 100 women and girls have alleged sexual misconduct and abuse at the hands of WHO employees, with over a dozen men also claiming abuse as well. 

Furthermore, evidence from internal meetings indicates that eight senior WHO officials acknowledged the organization's failure to effectively address sexual exploitation during the Ebola outbreak, recognizing the systemic nature of the problem. 

Recently, The WHO has compensated at least 104 Congolese women alleging sexual abuse or exploitation by Ebola response officials with a paltry $250 each. For context, this amount falls short of a single day's expenses for some UN officials stationed in the nation's capital. Furthermore, nearly a third of known victims have yet to receive any payments due to what the WHO amounts to as an “inability” to locate them". The WHO has also offered limited support to alleviate medical costs incurred for 17 children who have resulted from the sexual exploitation and abuse. 

Many of the women who received payments as compensation for their abuse were made to complete “training courses” in order to encourage them to participate in “income-generating activities”, with one woman claiming she could not receive her payment until she took a baking class. These methods have been critiqued by Paula Donavan, co-director for the Code Blue campaign, who believes they “set uncomfortable conditions for victims of wrongdoing seeking help.” 

Currently, the WHO’s Congo office has a budget of nearly 175 million dollars, with its biggest funding coming from the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation. The organization's insufficient compensation of $26,000 to victims of sexual misconduct in Congo represents barely 1% of their $2 million “Survivor Assistance Fund”. This fund is specifically dedicated to supporting victims of such abuse, so this trivial recourse by the WHO raises concerns about the organization's commitment to addressing this issue.

The WHO has since only arrested 5 members of their staff for sexual misconduct since 2021, resulting in a deep distrust for the organization by Congolese women. Many women who allege abuse by WHO staff believe the agency hasn't done enough. These women have expressed their desires for their perpetrators to be brought to justice and for additional compensation and resources for their trauma. Congolese women and girls are now worried about what might happen if there is a future health crisis in the region. The Congo is currently experiencing extreme increases in violence, a severe lack of resources, and staggering displacement–with nearly 7 million Congolese uprooted from their homes. This means that emergency responses in the future will be heavily reliant on organizations such as the WHO and other branches of the UN. 

Ultimately, the WHO must take immediate and comprehensive action to address the issue of sexual abuse and exploitation by its staff. This includes providing comprehensive training to all staff members, creating a safe and confidential reporting system, and implementing oversight and regular audits of its policies and procedures. The WHO must also provide adequate support to victims of abuse, work with local communities to raise awareness and empower women, and perhaps most importantly, they must hold all perpetrators accountable for their actions. Transparency and accountability are key to regaining the trust of the Congolese people, and the WHO must be vigilant, open, and honest about its efforts to address these issues. 

The full report of the Independent Commission on the review of sexual abuse and exploitation during the response to the 10th Ebola virus disease epidemic can be found here.

A Hostage Deal on the Horizon: Updates on Israel and Palestine Conflict

After Hamas’ attack on October 7th, resulting in the death of 1,200 Israeli people, Israel has pursued a goal to eliminate the Hamas group once and for all. Indeed, as Israel continues its air and ground campaign on Gaza, another goal lies amidst both the Israeli and Hamas parties– the safe return of hostages. According to a recent article released by CNN, weeks of negotiations between the United States, Egypt, Hamas, and Israel led to an agreement for a temporary truce and hostage release. Hostages from both war parties involved will first be released on Friday morning when there is a temporary pause of fighting. Although the truce is expected to be short, it could potentially be longer, as each 10 additional hostages released from both sides will account for an extra day. Thus, the truce has the potential to last around 10 days, but Israeli officials believe that is largely unlikely. Another CNN article discusses specific questions regarding the identities of the hostages planned to be released and the routes they will take. Hostage names have yet to be published and have instead been kept to the parties involved. Routes these hostages will take when released have also not been disclosed for safety and security purposes.

This hostage deal has caught the attention– and hearts– of hundreds of thousands of people across the globe—the Pope included. Politico shares how the Pope met with the relatives of both Israeli and Palestinian hostages to hear their stories. However, by referring to the conflict with words of “terrorism” and “genocide”, the Pope has set off a diplomatic firestorm, upsetting numerous hostage relatives present. Clearly, tensions remain high between Israelis and Palestinians– not just those in Gaza—but around the world. As the world continues to bicker and take sides in this conflict, we can only hope for a long-term solution similar to that of the approaching truce—and pray that the truce holds up in the mere four days it is meant to take place.

A Legacy Stained by Blood: Henry Kissinger

At 100 years old, Henry Kissinger, a man who danced on the edge of history, has left the stage. While some hail him as a master diplomat, others see him as a war criminal, a sincerely depraved architect of suffering.

Kissinger's resume boasts “achievements” that glitter like gilded cages. He brokered Nixon's opening to China, a geopolitical coup. He “helped end” the Vietnam War–at a cost of millions displaced and scarred. But beneath these headlines lies a darker narrative, one woven with the threads of countless deaths.

Cambodia. Kissinger oversaw the secret carpet bombing of Cambodia, a neutral country, to target Vietnamese soldiers. It is believed that he approved each of the 3,875 raids, causing massive civilian casualties and potentially fueling the Khmer Rouge's rise to power. Countless civilians perished under American B-52s, their screams lost in the cacophony of explosions. This wasn't just a miscalculation; it was a deliberate act, a callous gamble with human lives.

Chile. A brutal military junta, fueled by Nixon's covert backing and Kissinger's alleged green light, toppled a democratically elected leader. Salvador Allende, a symbol of hope, was replaced by a regime of torture and terror. Kissinger's obsession with order over freedom paved the way for another bloodbath.

These are not isolated blemishes; they are the starkest marks on a canvas of questionable interventions. Bangladesh, Indonesia, East Timor – the list stretches long, each entry a testament to the human cost of Kissinger's cold pragmatism.

While Kissinger only served as Secretary of State for two presidential administrations, Ford and Nixon, he consulted on national security matters for over a decade prior with the Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson administrations. But “brilliance” can curdle into monstrosity when wielded without conscience. Kissinger's intellect served not as a beacon of morality, but as a tool to rationalize away the suffering he caused. He spoke of "stability" while nations bled–of "national interest" while bodies piled high.

His death shouldn't be an occasion for ghoulish glee but for sober reflection. It's a chance to re-examine the narratives we weave, to challenge the heroes we lionize and the villains we demonize. Kissinger was neither a saint nor a devil; he was a complex, contradictory figure who left an indelible mark, arguably horrific, on the world.

Let his death be a reminder that even the most lauded figures can cast long, dark shadows. Let it be a call to scrutinize power, demand accountability, and recognize the ethical implications of policy. For in the end, the true measure of a man lies not in his achievements, but in the lives he shattered along the way.

China’s Influence in the Developing World

Over the last decade, China has significantly expanded its influence in the developing world through trade agreements and infrastructure contracts. In fact, according to a Wall Street Journal article, “China is the world’s No. 1 source of international development finance, with some $1.34 trillion in loans and grants disbursed over 22 years for 20,985 projects in 165 low- and middle-income nations.” It has certainly become China’s intention to own as much sovereign debt as it can, as evidenced by its approximately $859 billion worth of US debt that it owns. However, what is more concerning is the increasingly favorable sentiment the developing world seems to have towards China relative to the West. 

Many scholars will argue that this phenomenon results from the fact that China does not seek to impose either classical liberal or neoliberal values on non Western nations, and if the United States did not involve itself in the domestic political affairs of developing countries, there would be no favorability to China. However, it is my opinion that it does remain the responsibility of the United States to advance Western values in relationships with the developing world, and to set American value standards for the countries with whom it interacts remains nonnegotiable. 

As a result, one must examine another trend in American policy over the last decade that is responsible for this increasing shift towards China, and that is increased trade protectionism. To illustrate, in Latin America, a region in which the United States has always exhibited dominance, the country of Uruguay, which also happens to be a relatively affluent, democratic country, has shifted towards China. According to a Wall Street Journal article, “for years, Uruguay has tried and failed to get a free-trade deal with the U.S. The center-right government here in Montevideo is now negotiating one with China, which has stepped up donations to the country’s schools, hospitals and military in recent years.” The article goes further, even describing a “school, a steel and glass structure where students take Mandarin classes and learn how to make mooncakes, traditional Chinese pastries. The poorest kids have never before been as far as the beach, which is 5 miles away, but they now dream of going to China, she said,” and the president of Uruguay, Luis Lacalle Pou, is quoted as explaining, “The U.S., the land of the free and the free market is seeing a rise in protectionism.” 

Regardless of the political debate over free trade, clearly, the United States is no longer in a position to engage in restrictive trade practices if it wishes to maintain its influence and relationship with the developing world. Trade agreements and financial contracts are the proxy wars of a new era of great power competition and should be pursued liberally and aggressively. Otherwise, countries around the world will continue to turn to and eventually align with China.

Critical but stable: state of escalation in Israel-Hamas conflict

As the unfolding conflict between Israel and Hamas begins its second month, it is crucial to assess the current situation, combatant participation, and potential for escalation. While the ongoing multi-dimensional conflict between Hamas and allied fighters and the Israeli Defense Forces has kept tensions soaring in an unsettled Middle East, a significant expansion of the war, as expected in the first weeks, has thankfully not yet occurred. This assessment will detail some aspects of the current state of tensions, dubbed “critical but stable.” 

Since the beginning of Israel’s retaliatory airstrikes within Gaza, Hezbollah, a Lebanese political party with a substantial militant component, has been carefully watched by many for signs of escalatory intent. The group, which has increased its alignment with Hamas following the October 7 attacks, was founded by Iran’s Revolutionary Guards force and remains a key member of Iran’s “Axis of Resistance.” Since the group’s last major conflict with Israel, a five-week war in 2006, Hezbollah has increased its striking power to include an estimated 100,000 rockets; it is considered by many observers to be (one of) the most heavily armed non-state groups in the world. This reality made credible the Iranian foreign minister’s October 14 threat that continued Israeli action in Gaza could lead to a “huge earthquake” unleashed by Hezbollah.

For weeks, Hezbollah has targeted Israeli tanks, security cameras, and border units along Israel’s northern border with Lebanon, though these attacks have had limited scope and impact. The Institute for the Study of War (ISW), a preeminent Washington-based think-tank that analyzes open-source intelligence on ongoing global conflicts, continues to assess that Hezbollah’s limited cross-border attacks are part of the Axis of Resistance’s attempts to “draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there.” 

In his much-anticipated November 3 speech, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah addressed expectations of an escalatory announcement by arguing that Hezbollah had been involved in the fighting since October 8. He declared that US military assets in the Mediterranean “will not scare us,” and stated that the group could resort to any of its options at any time. Though concerning, Nasrallah’s speech was not the announcement of expanded attacks against Israel that many feared. There have thus far been few recent indicators of an impending Hezbollah escalation, and observable indicators suggest that the current pattern of harassing, force-fixing cross-border attacks will continue. 

As Hezbollah mortars and anti-tank missiles strike Israeli positions along the northern border, IED attacks and shootouts in the West Bank also remain daily occurrences. In recent days, ISW has continued its trend of assessing these West Bank clashes as continuing at their “usual rate.” Though the frequency and intensity of these clashes between Palestinian militants and IDF forces in the West Bank are significantly higher than the pre-war norm, they have not consistently followed calls for uprisings in the territory issued by Hamas and other Axis of Resistance elements. Thus, unrest in the West Bank has not yet materialized into a broader escalation of the war or situation destabilizing enough to warrant a significant diversion of IDF resources from its ongoing campaign in Gaza. 

Crucially, Iran, one of the critical actors in this conflict, does not appear to be pushing for a regional escalation despite its fiery rhetoric against Israeli and American responses to the October 7 Hamas attacks. Strong arguments have been advanced regarding Iran’s hesitancy to escalate further; any opening of a new front by Hezbollah along Israel’s northern border would likely trigger a substantial Israeli response, endangering the group’s military capabilities and political position in an unstable Lebanon. Iran’s sanctions-aggravated economic problems and desire for elements of its Axis of Resistance to retain their relatively strong capacities discourage the regime from pushing for further escalation. Were any of its various proxies to engage Israel meaningfully or especially draw the fire of American forces in the region, Iran would run the risk of losing a group that could be used to pressure Israel to curtail Gaza Bank activities. 

For their part, the Houthi rebels in Yemen have attempted several cruise missile and drone attacks against Israel. An American guided missile destroyer shot down three cruise missiles and several drones comprising the first Houthi attack. The five subsequent attacks have utilized more drones but have largely been intercepted by Israeli air-defense systems. Houthi rebels notably succeeded in shooting down an American MQ-9 Reaper surveillance drone this week and will likely not face escalation as a result of the shoot-down’s limited significance. Though Houthi forces likely possess more Iranian-made land-attack cruise missiles, the group is unlikely to launch them in numbers large enough to strain or overcome extensive Israeli air defenses. Thus, the potential for Houthi-driven escalation remains quite low. 

This recap of various relevant actors’ recent actions and the prevailing understanding of Iran’s interest in avoiding an escalation of the conflict into a regional war indicate that a continued state of “critical but stable” tension is likely to persist in the short term. Given the potential for new factors to be introduced at short notice, predicting the likelihood of a regional escalation beyond the near term remains unrealistic. Additionally, changes in the extent or tactics of Israel’s ground operation in Gaza hold the potential to drive further escalation. For now, the war has settled into a relative holding pattern, continuing to destroy countless lives daily and obliterating near-term hopes for a resolution.

The United States and China Take Action on the Climate Crisis

The United Nations recently called out the Paris Climate Agreement member states for failing to abide by the climate goals drafted seven years ago. In preparation for the upcoming COP28 Conference, the United Nations released its Global Stocktake report, pressuring states to prepare advised climate plans in the weeks leading up to the conference.

The United Nations' evaluation of the progress of the Paris Climate Agreement was not a gentle nudge for states to make improvements. This grim report was an urgent call for completely revised climate plans and rededication to reducing emissions. 

Key findings from the report confirmed that the world is not on track to meet the long-term goals of the Paris Agreement and that urgent, dramatic measures are needed to outrace the narrowing gap of time out before the earth has warmed to the point of catastrophe. 

There is no measure more dramatic than the world’s leading polluters, China and the United States, agreeing to a series of meetings in Rancho Mirage, California, this week. The rival powers tasked John Kerry, the US climate envoy, and Xie Zhenhua, a former Chinese environment minister, to discuss potential coordination on increasing their use of clean energy and sending aid to help developing nations transfer to green energy. 

However, for China and the United States to discuss necessary measures on climate change is both a political and an economic minefield. 

The United States is politically cautious to take any action seen as being soft on China. The upcoming presidential election is a cause for hesitancy in the Biden administration, as any partnership with China is likely to receive mass scrutiny. Tensions between the two states are strained as Taiwanese politics remain a potential fuse likely to blow up any cooperative acts planned across the Pacific. 

Waiting for the upcoming COP28 conference, states across the globe are holding their breath for any action taken by China or the United States. 

Progress in the climate agreement is dependent upon the commitment of both states to renew their commitment to clean energy. Signals from either state will determine the aggressiveness of other countries’ climate action plans. 

The world is on fire, but is that enough for these new-age rivals to cooperate?

The Future of African Representation in Multinational Organizations

History, like foreign policy, is often written by the victors. The outcome of the decades of world war beginning in the early 20th century that did not truly end until the late 1980s has been a world order forged through blood and steel that has since been driven and dominated by those countries that held and fought over power over 70 years ago. Those left on top: The United States, Great Britain, France, Russia, and (debatably) China, have held the wheel of the great engine of policymaking ever since. One could look at this international order and see a decent representation of most of the major continents on Earth: The Americas, Europe, and Asia. Obviously missing from this international picture, however, is Africa. 

The international order that had existed in the hundreds of years prior to the actions towards independence that were just beginning to be taken by the time of the end of the Second World War was designed deliberately to exploit the African continent. The trans-Atlantic slave trade is an example, through which millions upon millions of innocent African people exported as livestock and put into abhorrent conditions of chattel slavery predominantly in America while Europe and the United States got rich from the profit of their labor. The exploitative colonial rule that was established during the “Scramble for Africa” of the late 19th Century was just as exploitative and inhumane, and the legacies of colonial oppression are still being felt across the continent. 

As such, African people don’t see these decades of oppression as truly being in the past. Foreign Affairs cites the “CFA Franc, a relic of the colonial past that still gives France tremendous sway over the economies of 14 West African countries,” as a “daily reminder of this historical subjugation.” They have been left behind in humanitarian efforts, like the failure of the United Nations to act during the Rwandan genocide of the 1990s while being forced to bear the aftereffects of great-power intervention that has led to the rise of various extremist movements, like the Islamic State and Al Shabab, that undermine the stability of domestic politics in numerous African countries. 

This pattern of injustice calls for a change in the power and representation of African nations in important multinational organizations. Take the United Nations Security Council, for example. The International Peace Institute  cites that most Security Council meetings concern African security issues, yet no African nation is represented among the permanent 5 members. “It is a travesty of justice,” writes Tim Murithi, “that African countries can only participate in deliberations and negotiations about their own futures on such unequal terms.” 

What must be done to overcome this systematic lack of representation of the continent in which 1.2 billion people live is a dramatic change in the United Nations charter. If a charter review council can be secured, then African nations can work together to change the system that exists in the Security Council in order to access more power for the determination of African futures. 

China’s Stance on Israel-Hamas War

The Russia-Ukraine war has dominated the front page of major media platforms for almost two years. But on Oct 7, the page looked something completely different. 

Israel declared its country to be in a state of war, as the armed forces led by Hamas launched an attack on several Israeli communities, killing 1,400 civilians and kidnapping about 240 civilians. Since then, the world has been centering its gaze on the appalling Israel-Hamas war.

China was unusually swift in responding to the war. It generalizes the Israel-Hamas war as a result of the prolonged Israel-Palestine conflict. On Oct 13, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi claimed China’s position as a “friend to both Israel and Palestine” during a press conference with EU diplomat Josep Borrell. 

He also added, “Israel has the right to statehood, so does Palestine. The Israelis have obtained the safeguards for survival, but who will care about the survival of the Palestinians? The Jewish nation is no longer homeless in the world, but when will the Palestinian nation return to its home?”

On Oct. 18, President Xi made his first remark and called for an immediate cease-fire in the Israel-Hamas war. The next day, during his meeting with Egyptian Prime Minister Mostafa Madbouly in Beijing, President Xi claimed that the key to stopping the conflict was establishing an independent state of Palestine through a two-state resolution.

Despite China’s persistent concern for terrorism, it refrained from using the term when describing Hama’s attack. 

To retaliate, Israel escalated airstrikes across the Gaza Strip, killing at least 2,670 civilians and cutting off food, water and electricity to the Palestine enclave. 

In response to Israel’s retaliation, China and the US, once again, upheld opposite stances. 

“Israel’s actions have gone beyond self-defense, and it should heed the call of the international community and the Secretary-General of the United Nations to stop its collective punishment of the people in Gaza,” Wang Yi told his Saudi Arabia counterpart Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud in a call several days after. 

On the same day, Secretary of State Anthony Blinkin told reporters in Cairo that “Israel has the right – indeed it has the obligation – to defend itself against these attacks from Hamas, and to try to do what it can to make sure that this never happens again.”

China had sided with the Palestinians and Arab nations since the mid-1960s when Chairman Mao Zedong’s government offered military and diplomatic support to the Palestinian fighters. After the death of Chairman Mao, China softened its position in the Middle East, formally established diplomatic relations with Israel in 1992 and claimed “noninterference” in the Middle East affairs. 

Under President Xi, China’s economic influence in the Middle East grew, and it started to side with the Arab nations and mediate the Israel-Palestine conflict.

In June 2023, the president of the Palestinian Authority, Mahmoud Abbas, signed a strategic partnership with President Xi in exchange for Chinese economic aid. In return to China’s favor, Abba said China’s policies towards Uyghurs in Xinjiang have “nothing to do with human rights and are aimed at excising extremism and opposing terrorism and separatism.”

Despite China having criticized Hama’s brutal attack on Israel, its criticism of Israel’s retaliation is far more direct. 

Since the Middle East is deeply divided over the Israel-Palestine conflict, China’s rhetorical support for Palestine also implies its affinity with other Arab countries and a potential counterplay on the US stance in the region. 

China’s Foreign Ministry declined to comment on whether it will do anything in the region to help stop the fighting. One possibility to look out for is whether China will stretch its influence over Iran, Hamas’ long-time ally, or help reestablish Iran-Saudi diplomatic relations to restrain Hamas’ brutality.

UNCLOS Update: Tensions with China in South China Sea Increase

During the 17th century, maritime exploration reached its peak. Countries developed unspoken conventions regarding laws of the sea; the United Nations’ Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea explains how, then, nations owned a narrow strip of ocean around their coastlines while the open sea was free to everyone. However, the 20th century brought about unavoidable issues—pollution, overfishing, and international tensions threatened the previous maritime rules. In 1945, President Truman extended United States control over oil, gas, minerals, and other resources off their continental coast, challenging the freedom-of-the-seas doctrine. These developments led the United Nations to establish the Convention on the Law of the Sea in 1982; the international body recognized the need for expanded rules and regulations on the sea in response to the changing world. Despite these diplomatic efforts, however, tensions between world superpowers still exist and worsen over matters of our open oceans. 

Tensions between countries continue to rise over matters of the sea, whether it is between neighbors in Oceania or China in the South China Sea. According to Boston University’s Frederick S. Pardee School of Global Studies, Japan and Australia constantly disagree regarding fishing policies. Japan has a notorious history for ignoring the convention’s regulations regarding fishing. In 1999, Australia and New Zealand sued Japan over the depletion of the southern bluefin tuna, and again in 2010 over illegal whaling. Not only does UNCLOS divide these countries, but so do their cultural values and interests in the seas. 

Prominent differences also exist between China and other superpowers regarding the division of the South China Sea. The Associated Press shares how China continues to creep farther away from its designated UNCLOS boundaries, impeding coastlines and maritime activity of island nations in the region (e.g. the Philippines). Valuable resources, especially natural gas, are abundant in the South China Sea, making disputes even more hostile. Indeed, China is expected to sign a nonaggression pact with other Southeast Asian nations; however, little goes to support China’s genuinity in this effort. A CNN article explains how a Chinese jet sent a flare that could have dangerously affected Canadian military operations in the region. Western nations grumbled in response, hackles raised in light of China’s continuous pushing for greater control in the South China Sea.

Europe faces winter with full gas stores, global worries

As the coldest months of the year approach in the northern hemisphere, Western European citizens are again reaching for their wallets and dreading high heating bills. Though Europeans do not have to fear gas shortages this winter, heating prices will likely continue straining average earners’ finances. 

Following Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, a disturbing reality confronted Western European nations: a major supplier of the natural gas used to power industrial facilities and heat homes was no longer a desirable trade partner. As uncertainty abounded over the impact of the beginning full-scale war on gas supplies, nations like Germany, which had spent years building trade relationships and pipelines with Russia, began making 180-degree turns in energy strategy. 

With the Nord Stream I and II pipelines knocked offline by four explosions in September 2022 and other means of importing gas from Russia voluntarily abandoned, Europe turned to the United States, Qatar, and Australia as liquified natural gas (LNG) suppliers. Six terminals for the importation of LNG have been constructed and one expanded since Russia’s invasion.

While an increase in LNG imports helped alleviate initial supply concerns, it was not the only factor in avoiding feared power cuts and major economic damage in winter 2022. Experts cite milder weather, fuel switching to cheaper energy sources, and behavioral changes on the part of consumers and industrial producers priced out of the market as driving factors behind Europe’s lucky winter. 

Last year’s milder winter, which necessitated a smaller-than-expected drawdown of Europe’s natural gas stores, and a June 2022 EU regulation requiring an annual 90% fill-by target of 1 November saw that target reached in August this year. As of 5 November, EU storage levels hover at 99.5% full. 

While ample stores have been amassed in preparation for winter, a series of recent happenings have accompanied an increase in energy prices in Europe, with market prices rising 28% in October. Though oil prices have not yet been drastically affected by the conflict between Israel and Hamas, Hamas’ 7 October attack led market giant Chevron to freeze its Tamar natural gas field, located off Israel’s coast. The closure of this field, which provides gas to Egypt and Jordan and indirectly supplies Europe with LNG through Egyptian processing, has raised analysts’ fears of a dropoff or cessation of Egyptian LNG exports this winter. 

In a throwback to last year, a Baltic Sea gas pipeline linking Finland to the European gas network was damaged in early October, sending European gas markets surging to their highest price in six months. Though Finnish investigators now believe a Chinese container vessel damaged the pipeline with a dragging anchor, the incident demonstrated how Europe’s gas markets lie on a hair trigger. NATO patrols through the Baltic Sea have increased as inquiries into whether or not the damage was intentional continue.

While prices for European energy remain roughly €100 lower per megawatt hour than they were at this time last year, such events keep high energy bills on Europeans’ list of worries this fall. Some analysts predict residential and industrial consumption to remain “quite muted” due to high prices discouraging energy-intensive production of steel and chemicals and encouraging lower thermostat settings. 

Though high storage levels and persistent lower demand work in Europe’s favor this fall, Europeans should expect to again empty their pockets on energy bills if the conflict in Gaza expands. Israel’s ground invasion has yet to draw other actors into substantive open combat, with Lebanese Hezbollah continuing small-scale attacks to tie up Israeli troops along the northern border. If this group, described by the Wilson Center as the “most formidable non-state military actor in the Middle East,” expands its involvement in hostilities or the war becomes regional through other means, world energy prices will likely spike as exports from the oil-rich region are endangered. 

A Middle East again embroiled in war, further damage to vulnerable undersea pipelines, or a bitterly cold winter all hold the potential to bring returned worry to European gas supply and consumption. And, as Europe watchers have seen this year, energy prices retain the potential to spark culture-war-type conflict within Western European societies; the Gebäudeenergiegesetz (Building Energy Act) divided German society and government for months. The interplay between current red-hot geopolitical tensions and the European gas market will remain a topic of interest as temperatures fall.

Emerging Role of Artificial Intelligence in International Relations

What does this mean for developing nations?

The United Nations plays a crucial role in the developing relationship between AI and government. In July 2023, the AI Business described how the UN Security Council held its first meeting specifically dedicated to discussing global AI governance. A recent CNN article highlighted UN Secretary-General António Guterres’ belief that, in light of potential risks with advancing technology, the UN should seize this opportunity to create a new international entity to manage AI governance. This action would not be the first of its kind–the UN has stepped up multiple times in the past to address rising concerns, including creating bodies governing climate change and nuclear energy. How would this time be any different?

When the UN has stepped up in the past to address global issues, it has recognized its role in bridging the growing gap between developing and developed countries. Furthermore, developed countries that have greater access to AI and advancing technologies will reap these benefits before developing countries. Thus, as the world peacemaker, the UN is naturally held responsible for minimizing this gap; the UN explains how “eliminating fragmentation between countries and genders, but also in terms of resources and knowledge, could enable more people to contribute to the digital transformation underway.” UNESCO announced its intent on prioritizing Africa’s full participation in AI development and utilizing AI as a tool to promote economic growth. Moreover, the UN views AI as not only a potential warfare and humanitarian issue, but also as an ethical factor affecting economic development of developing nations.

AI is predicted to greatly impact global labor markets, such that developed countries will be less likely to source labor from developing countries. According to a 2019 European Parliament briefing by the, cheaper costs relevant to AI incentivize developed countries to replace outsourced labor with AI. Jobs will both be created and destroyed with the expansion of AI; although there is no consensus among experts, it is likely that changes in labor will follow past industrial patterns. Moreover, lower–paid jobs characterized by repetitive tasks and little qualifications to work are thus likely to be eliminated; AI can easily replace these tasks, widening the economic gap between international labor markets.

King Charles’ Contentious Visit to Kenya

When asked about a proliferous colonizer, the first country that comes to mind is the United Kingdom. They have a rather extensive history of inserting themselves into countries where they do not belong and wreaking havoc amongst all of the native citizens. The United Kingdom has even acknowledged from time to time their regretfulness over certain historic events, such as when Queen Elizabeth visited the Amritsar massacre site in India and paid her respects. Unfortunately, this is about as far as the U.K. is willing to go in regards to regretfulness, they often will not offer sincere apologies to those that they colonized, nor will they pay reparations for the citizens that suffered under their abusive hand. This legacy of deliberately evading their responsibility to reckon with their past continues with an upcoming visit from the current King to Kenya. 

King Charles III and Queen Camilla plan to visit Kenya starting on October 31 until November 3. King Charles plans to “...acknowledge the more painful aspects of the U.K. and Kenya’s shared history”. While this may sound promising, acknowledging what took place in Kenya is likely all that he plans to do… Many Kenyans wish for an official apology from the king, and many more would like reparations, and the return of stolen land that descendants of previous English settlers still own today. The United Kingdom’s lack of willingness to provide proper reparations to Kenya, among other previously colonized countries, may leave people wondering what their intentions are when returning to Kenya. The claimed reasoning is to continue relations with Kenya involving the U.K.’s agreement to train troops in Kenya, further economic relations between both countries and lastly encourage counter-terrorism efforts within Kenya. While these all may certainly be true, I believe that there is also hope that the crown holds to build its reputation globally. In recent years, support for the U.K. monarchy has been at an all-time low as many individuals are coming to learn of the atrocities that the crown has committed worldwide. Hopefully, King Charles’ visit to Kenya will prove beneficial more so for Kenya, and their grievances will be not only acknowledged but attended to, however knowing the U.K.'s track record, I do not hold high hopes. 

Polish Election

Hailed as a blow against the forces of far-right populism in Europe, the ruling party—Law and Justice (PiS)—has lost the 2023 Polish election. Despite this, the Civic Coalition headed by centrist Donald Tusk has a long way to go if he hopes to fully root out the illiberal cronyism now embedded in Polish democracy as a result of PiS rule.

Despite their victory in the polls, Tusk and his Civic Coalition will need to form a government with both the center-right Third Way and aptly named left-wing The Left. This coalition will require the three opposition parties to find common ground and, if they hope to enact legislation, find greater commonality aside from opposition to PiS and the party’s preference for democratic backsliding.

A further difficulty for the likely new coalition government lies in the PiS-aligned Polish President, Andrej Duda. Duda has already proven hard for Tusk to work with, with Duda preventing the formation of a new government under Tusk, preferring to allow PiS to finish their term despite their lack of a majority—delaying the appointment of a new government until December. The cooperation of Duda is imperative to the success of a Tusk government as if it wants to reverse the democratic backsliding initiated by PiS, it needs to gain Duda’s support or risk having its legislation regularly vetoed by the President.

But it is not just the PiS-adjacent President that Tusk needs to worry about, but also the remnants of PiS that have been embedded into the Polish state apparatus. The Polish Constitutional Tribunal and media have also been heavily stacked with PiS loyalists. If the Tusk government hopes to reverse Poland’s backsliding into illiberalism, they have the daunting task before them of reversing these appointments while not getting their legislation shot down by the President and ruled unconstitutional by the Tribunal. And this process will take time, something the PiS is apt not to give a Tusk government.

Similarly to the contemporary American political culture of divisive politics and vast chasms of political division, a Civic Coalition victory does not eliminate the large political divide in Poland. Despite seemingly losing the election, PiS still won the plurality vote, taking 35.4% of the vote, more than any other party. While one could argue that this is a result of division amongst the opposition, it is undeniable that there is still a broad base of support for PiS in Poland. Winning overwhelmingly in rural districts, PiS will hold onto its strongholds and continue to do what it can to sew division in Polish society—exploiting its vast networks in media and equally vast funding.

While it is easy to cast Tusk’s victory as a victory for liberal democracy and a blow to far-right populism, the caveats are glaring. If the Tusk coalition hopes to keep power and reverse PiS’s authoritarian reforms, it needs to ensure that the coalition is able to govern; both through working to pass policy as a cohesive government, effectively dealing with Duda, the stacked courts, and attempt to heal the social and political divide in Poland or risk a PiS return.

Deportation and New Border Barriers— Biden’s Responses to the Ongoing Border Crisis

During the first eight months of 2023, over 330,000 migrants have crossed the border, with 60 percent coming from Venezuela and 21 percent being children. In response to the migrant influx, Republican governors of border states such as Florida and Texas have sent these migrants northward to major cities, mainly Democratic-led, without further consideration of the budget strain, housing shortage and humanitarian crisis that these cities will have to endure.  

As a consequence, the shelter system reached a breaking point in those cities, particularly New York City, where migrants take over half of the population. Migrants mainly had been sheltering in hotels, school gyms, vacant offices and parking lots, but now, many sleep on the street as a result of housing shortage and eviction. Meanwhile, due to work authorization delays, most of these migrants cannot work to provide for themselves, straining the city’s budget as it continues providing for free housing and food. 

In response to the migrant crisis, on Oct. 5, the Biden administration announced that it would start deporting Venezuelans who entered the United States unlawfully and expedite the construction of new barriers along the U.S.-Mexico border. The actions were a significant turnabout for Biden who often attacked Trump’s “build the wall” policy as ineffective and unAmerican. Reacting to his new immigration policies, not only did the Republicans mock Biden for finally building a wall he didn’t believe to be effective, immigration advocates also decried Biden for choosing politics over humanity. 

Since the deportation policy was issued, the number of Venezuelans crossing the border has declined from over 2,000 per day to about 850, the data from The Washington Post shows. But the humanitarian crisis in Venezuela remains unresolved, as the State Department recently listed over 34 major human rights issues, including arbitrary killings, forced disappearance, strict censorship and violence by security forces. 

The start of deportation flights to Venezuela this October is part of a broader diplomatic deal to ease economic sanctions on the autocratic government of President Nicolás Maduro. According to ICE officials, they intended to send two to three planeloads of deportees back to Venezuela per week. 

Immigration advocates denounced this as dehumanizing as the deportation happened after Biden promised to issue temporary legal status to 470,000 Venezuelans in the United States. And the decline of Venezuelans crossing the border has not alleviated New York City’s housing crisis. And this is primarily due to the influx of Venezuelans migrating from other cities in the United States rather than from Venezuela. 

This year, Republicans have been suing to block Biden’s program that grants two-year travel authorization to over 30,000 migrants from Cuba, Nicaragua, Haiti and Venezuela per month through U.S. sponsorships. But what would affect Biden’s immigration policies is also the U.S. diplomatic relations with the Maduro government.

Suppose the deal to ease the economic sanctions falls apart. In that case, Maduro will likely halt the deportation flights, leaving the United States to seek alternative solutions to continue fighting the migration and humanitarian crisis.