An Analysis of EU Accession talks

Since Croatia’s EU accession in 2013, the bloc struggled to find the political will from its member states to continue expansion. The Migrant Crisis, Eurozone crisis, COVID, and increasingly autocratic regimes in countries like Poland and Hungary put any serious discussion of expanding the EU on hold. However, in 2022 following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, political shockwaves rippled throughout the continent. In the weeks following the start of the invasion, Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia all officially applied for EU candidate status, with Ukraine and Moldova receiving candidate status later that summer, and Georgia the following year. Longtime hopeful Bosnia and Herzegovina was also given candidate status in December of 2022. They joined Serbia, Albania, North Macedonia, Montenegro, and Türkiye as EU Candidate countries. However, despite the growing list, many of these respective countries’ negotiations have been stalled for upwards of 20 years for some countries. 

Montenegro is generally regarded as the country that is most likely to join the EU in the foreseeable future. A country of less than a million, they have moved rapidly through accession talks and negotiations after becoming an official candidate country in 2010. Its unilateral use of the euro, small population, and eagerness to join all have helped propel the country in the direction of accession. The EU President, Ursula Von der Leyen, even visited Montenegro recently, stating that the bloc is counting on Montenegro’s accession by 2028, becoming the 28th member of the EU. Barring an unforeseen veto or change in political circumstance, Montenegro is likely to become the EU’s next member state.

Albania is also considered one of the most likely countries to join the EU in the foreseeable future. Albania was granted EU candidate status in 2014, and has since opened all negotiation chapters, and provisionally closed three. Following the decoupling of its bid from North Macedonia’s in 2024, the main concerns about Albania’s bid have been related to corruption and rule of law. Though the EU has applauded increased efforts to combat corruption in recent years, Albania’s battle with corruption is chronic. Issues ranging from rule of law to organized crime still persist. The EU’s current goal is for Albania’s accession to be achieved by 2030, and despite public support for EU membership, public discontent with the current government and EU concerns about corruption may very well delay Albania’s eventual accession to the bloc.

North Macedonia has had disputes over identity and sovereignty with both Greece and Bulgaria, which both are EU members, and have both vetoed progression in the country’s EU accession talks since 2005. As of October 2026, the Greek dispute has been resolved since 2019 via the Prespa Agreement, which changed the name of the country to North Macedonia. However, the following year Bulgaria began its dispute over cultural heritage, language, and Bulgarian minorities in North Macedonia. In 2022, a French brokered compromise passed the North Macedonian parliament, but could not clear the 2/3rds majority for a constitutional amendment, something Bulgaria requires in order to lift its veto. It is also important to note that if Albania joins the bloc before North Macedonia, it is not out of the question that further vetoes may be imposed given the sizable Albanian minority in the country, and the history of armed insurgency by Albanian minorities in the country.

Serbia was first granted candidate status in 2012, and has since opened 22 negotiation chapters. One of the most pertinent obstacles to further progression in Serbia’s EU accession talks is its relations with the Russian Federation. As of July 2026, 8 countries refused to open the next cluster of negotiation chapters in part due to concerns about Serbia’s non compliance with sanctions against Russia. Kosovo is another hurdle in the negotiations. The EU is requiring Serbia to normalize relations with the breakaway state recognized by most EU states. Additional concerns range from democratic backsliding, corruption, organized crime, and the legacy of the Yugoslav Wars. Unlike Albania or Montenegro’s set timeline, or North Macedonia’s specific political hurdles, Serbia’s EU accession hopes are plagued by a myriad of cultural, political, and diplomatic issues that are not likely to be solved in the foreseeable future. 

Bosnia and Herzegovina was granted EU candidate status in 2022, but this is more symbolic than anything else. The EU technically opened formal accession talks in 2024, yet no progress has been made. In part, this is due to Bosnia’s complex political structure and power sharing agreement across its three main ethnicities, Bosniaks, Bosnian Serbs, and Bosnian Croats. The lack of political will from Republika Srpska, a political entity making up part of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, has effectively stalled any hopes for continued progress with EU accession. Other issues ranging from corruption, Russian influence, rule of law, and domestic political reforms are pertinent in Bosnia, and the country will require substantial internal reforms before EU membership becomes a reality. 

Moldova was granted EU candidate status in 2022 alongside Ukraine, and has promising tailwinds following the effective decoupling of the Moldovan and Ukrainian bids in recent months. Moldovan elections and referendums, despite Russian interference, have constantly shown a desire to further European integration, as opposed to further integration with Russia. Moldova has progressed in opening accession clusters in recent months, and following the change in government in Hungary, the country has no clear opposition to its continued push for integration from within the EU. The primary preoccupation with Moldova’s bid is security. Within Moldova’s internationally recognized borders sits the breakaway region of Transnistria, a self-proclaimed independent state that hosts Russian troops. With Russia increasingly using hybrid warfare against frontline EU members, Moldovan accession could bring even more security concerns for Brussels. 

Since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine began in 2022, the EU has firmly supported the country through diplomatic, defensive, humanitarian, and economic means. Accession talks formally opened up in 2026, after Orbán’s successor Péter Magyar removed Hungary’s veto. Despite the recent progress, concerns about corruption, and cheap Ukrainian goods flooding the single market remain principal amongst current members. Though negotiations will likely continue through war time, there are few leaders who aim to speed up the process, or integrate Ukraine into the bloc while still being actively invaded by Russia. Ukraine’s bid rests heavily on if and when peace talks arrive in the country.

Georgia and Türkiye’s bids are both regarded as indefinitely on hold due to serious concerns over democratic backsliding, corruption, and relations with Russia. Though Türkiye’s bid has been effectively suspended for over 10 years, Georgia’s recent pivot away from the EU is much more nuanced than a steady erosion of democratic principles. The ruling party, Georgian Dream, both applied for EU membership in 2022, and subsequently passed anti-democratic and personal freedoms laws in 2024, later suspending EU membership talks on their end. This was due to immense public pressure following the 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine. This pivot back towards Russia links back to existing oligarch networks, EU conditionality, and the Ukraine war dragging on. 

The EU’s accession talks will continue as the bloc cautiously pursues enlargement. Though some bids, such as Montenegro’s, appear promising, most remaining candidates raise serious concerns relating to security, the rule of law, territorial integrity, or the potential economic burden on current member states. As the EU considers the prospect of reaching 30 members by 2030, it must approach accession deliberately while maintaining internal cohesion. Yet the reforms needed to support enlargement cannot be limited to candidate countries; the EU must also look inward. The use of vetoes in accession by countries such as Hungary, Greece, and Bulgaria has undermined the credibility of the accession process itself. Before undertaking any major expansion, the bloc must address the risk that individual member states, such as Hungary under Orbán, can obstruct collective decision-making and weaken the union’s cohesion.