Why an Irish Unity Referendum Looks More Likely Than Ever

Following the signing of the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, the political fate of Northern Ireland has been put directly in the hands of its residents. Almost 30 years later, the politics of the North can be described as both chaotic, and perpetually gridlocked. Disagreements between Unionist (Loyal to Westminster) and Republican (Pro-unification with the Republic of Ireland) lawmakers have rendered the government deeply inefficient, with only 12 bills passed into law since 2024. Debates over the Northern Irelands’s political status have existed long before the Good Friday Agreement was signed, but in recent years the conversation that has come to dominate politics both on the island of Ireland and in Westminster has been the subject of reunification with the Republic of Ireland. 

After the Brexit vote in 2016, in which the North voted remain by 11 points, the subject of a hard border on the island of Ireland became a topic of intense debate and worry. Though the Good Friday Agreement does not explicitly mention the banning of a land border on the island, leaders in the Republic of Ireland, in the North, and even in Westminster did not support a hard border, in part due to fears of damaging the fragile peace on the island. The current agreement maintains an effective trade boundary in the Irish Sea, with Northern Ireland remaining aligned with relevant EU single-market rules for goods to avoid a hard border with the Republic of Ireland, still an EU member. As the post-Brexit political chaos throughout the UK unfolded, voters in Northern Ireland elected their first pro-unity government and first ever nationalist First Minister in 2024. Since then, Republican parties in the North and Republic of Ireland have called for a unity referendum by the end of the decade.

Both Unionist leaders in Northern Ireland and current British Prime Minister Andy Burnham are against a unity referendum. However, the decision to call a referendum is not up to the Prime Minister of the UK, but rather is at the discretion of the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, according to the Good Friday Agreement. The agreement states that the Secretary of State must hold a border poll if it appears likely that a majority in the North would vote for Irish unification. However vague this condition is, what is clear is that it has not been met yet. Since Brexit, polling for a United Ireland in the North has been steadily increasing, though it is not at an outright majority. It is important to note that a unity referendum would only need a simple majority to win. Meaning, that if the rise of support both in opinion polling and with increased electoral gains by Irish Nationalist parties, there is a concrete chance that the condition of ‘appearing likely to vote for unification’ will be met. Alongside a poll in the North, voters in the Republic of Ireland will also have to approve unification. This could turn out to be a surprising hurdle in the process, as despite high support on paper, the sheer economic disparity of the two entities may persuade voters in the South to vote no. 

Whatever the potential outcome may be, it is undeniable that the winds of political change are moving away from Westminster, and towards Dublin and the EU. As the UK stumbles through Prime Ministers and post-Brexit economic blues, voters in the North may increasingly look to Dublin, and more so the European Union, as a more stable and economically viable future. 

A Golden Sign of Global Economic Restructuring

Earlier this month, the Dutch central bank completed a relocation of $11 billion worth of gold from vaults in Ottawa and New York City to London. The operation required months of quiet collaboration among the US, Canadian, English, and Dutch central banks, private banks, and security and logistics firms to transfer some 80 metric tons of the precious metal.

Gold transfers and trades have a historical precedence. The Federal Reserve Bank of New York received large quantities in the WWII era for fear of Nazis reaching allied gold stored in Europe. In fact, Britain even moved its entire reserve to Canada during the same period. Globally, central banks tend to increase inventory of gold in times of crisis or financial uncertainty, like that of 2008.

Redistribution of the resource also acts as a risk mitigation strategy, with the Netherlands striving for a “more balanced” geographical allocation of its reserves so as to not concentrate too much in one site. Shifting gold from one site to another does not imply that a country’s entire reserve has moved, though. Almost one-fifth of the Dutch supply still resides underneath Manhattan. Repositioning reserves can be achieved through physical shipment, or by selling it in the existing market and purchasing the same amount in another market.

While occasional transfers are typical and risk mitigation is a strategic decision, the context of this shipment and implications are worth noting.

A key reason for the Dutch central bank’s decision was to bolster “its crisis preparedness” amid “increasing geopolitical unrest.” Geopolitical tensions have been on the rise globally, including between the United States and Canada – the two North American sites holding the Netherlands’ gold. The neighboring countries are at odds as recent trade negotiations failed and new tariffs were announced. Affairs between the US and European Union are also strained following threats of annexing Greenland, Washington’s pulling of troops, disagreements over the US-Iran war, and trade tensions.

The relocation of Dutch gold represents another example of a wider shift away from an economic paradigm of efficiency to a model focused on resiliency and security. Decades of globalization are unraveling as supply chains become subject to volatile shocks and conflict increases globally. This is seen not only with the recent cloud technology unbundling, but also with a Western shift away from dependence on China’s critical minerals, European adoption of alternate energy sources following the 2022 Ukraine invasion, and America’s attempt to revitalize domestic manufacturing through steep tariffs.

Dependencies once justified by cost and efficiency are now being revisited as potential liabilities. Gold reserves, energy providers, critical minerals, manufacturing, and digital infrastructure have already been affected. So, as geopolitical risk becomes an increasingly important factor in decision making, the question becomes: what part of the supply chain is next to be restructured? 

Make Germany Great Again

It’s hard to deny the similarities between the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) party and Donald Trump’s MAGA movement, not that anyone is trying particularly hard. They share the same nationalist ideology (just swap out the nation), weaponize much of the same rhetoric (a little creativity, anyone?), and their leadership is similarly hypocritical (if you’re going to be anti-LGBTQ, having a lesbian party leader requires a bit of mental gymnastics). Yet Trump’s enthusiasm for the AfD’s recent win in Saxony-Anhalt, where they received 43.8% of the vote–the strongest showing for any far-right party in Germany since WWII–may be a little short-sighted. It is exactly the similarities between the two movements that could make an AfD-led Germany a poor ally for Trump’s America. After all, who has America First ever promised to put second?

America’s polarization is largely reflected in the urban-rural divide while Germany’s runs East-West. In both countries, these geographic divides overlap with differences in class, religion, education, and access to economic opportunity. Trump exploited America’s division to appeal to voters who felt ignored by the political establishment. The AfD has done much the same in East Germany, appealing to the German identity of those who have felt left behind after Germany’s reunification–which for many has solidified as resentment towards West Germany. Both campaigns successfully motivated people who had grown disillusioned with the current political systems, with the AfD capturing the votes of 170,000 people in Saxony-Anhalt who had stopped voting.

Further, Trump has been known to scapegoat immigrants for America’s economic and social problems. He has blamed them for rising housing prices, portrayed them as a strain on public resources, and blamed them for violent crimes and drug-trafficking. Germany is home to the largest refugee population in Europe after accepting almost a million Syrian refugees after the outbreak of the civil war in 2011. This has given the AfD the opportunity to borrow directly from Trump’s rhetoric and immigration policy promises–though the AfD has rebranded “deportation” as “remigration.” The AfD’s willingness to scapegoat the immigrant population, specifically those from the Middle East, was on full display in their response to the terrorist attack on Berlin Pride in July, which focused on the perpetrator’s potential migrant status and blamed Germany’s current migration policies for the attack (Abdul Ballout, the attacks’ perpetrator, was born in Germany). 

I spent a portion of my summer living in Halle (Saale), the second-largest city in Saxony-Anhalt, where the presence of Syrian refugees is impossible to miss. Many of the businesses in the city’s small downtown area are immigrant-owned. While walking through the area with my Arabic teacher, himself a Syrian refugee, he pointed out entire sections that had once sat empty until refugees opened up shops and restaurants. They hadn’t displaced anyone, they had reinvigorated a failing economy that was trying to support an aging population. 

The parallels between the two parties extend into other social issues. Both have used inflammatory language and supported policies that restrict the rights of the LGBTQ+ community. In 2019, for example, the AfD filed a motion to overturn Germany’s legalization of same-sex marriage. This is especially ironic given that one of the AfD’s most prominent national leaders, Alice Weidel, is married to a woman. This cognitive dissonance is almost entirely matched by Trump’s marriage to Melania, an immigrant from Slovenia, as he champions aggressive anti-immigration policies. 

A win for the AfD is not necessarily a win for Trump–not despite the similarities between the two movements, but because of them. Both preach national interests above all else, which is a strategy that does not promote or particularly value strong allyship (see Trump’s repeated agitation of long-term allies like Canada). While Trump has spent much of his administration asking NATO signatories to contribute more funding to the alliance as a means of reducing the burden on the U.S., the AfD have repeatedly expressed an unwillingness to comply and have made it clear that they would prefer a stronger relationship with Russia. The AfD has also endorsed China’s Belt and Road Initiative, signaling a willingness to work with one of the U.S.’ greatest competitors and threats. 

Who would have thought that Germany First might occasionally conflict with America First?